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THE ABCS OF COMMON LAW WRONGFUL
TERMINATION CLAIMS IN THE WASHINGTON
METROPOLITAN REGION
R. SCOTT OSWALD & MICHAEL L. VOGELSANG, JR.

I. INTRODUCTION
While there are numerous statutes protecting employees’ job security,
legal gaps still exist that render employees vulnerable in many ways. This
is especially true given the at-will nature of most employment in the United
States. To fill these gaps, most courts—including those of Maryland,
Virginia, and the District of Columbia— created common law tort actions
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Though the elements
of these claims are generally similar, each jurisdiction establishes important
limitations that employment attorneys must understand. The available
sources of public policy vary and there are many statutory remedies primed
to preempt related common law tort actions. The damages available under
wrongful termination do not suffer from the same caps as some statutory
claims, and the statutes of limitations fall in terms of years instead of days.
Nevertheless, some plaintiffs can still strategically benefit from bringing
actions under both the common law and state or federal statutes.
This article outlines the history of the “wrongful termination in violation
of public policy” tort, with a specific focus on Maryland, Virginia, and
Washington, D.C.1 Following the historical background is a discussion of
the elements of wrongful termination claims in those three jurisdictions,
including the various potential sources of public policy.2 After a brief
description of potential defenses, including preemption and available
damages, I conclude with practical advice and tips for litigating these types
of claims.3



R. Scott Oswald is the Managing Principal at The Employment Law Group, PC in
Washington, D.C. where they litigate wrongful termination, discrimination,
whistleblower retaliation, and other employment-related actions on behalf of
employees. Michael Lee Vogelsang, Jr., is a Litigation Associate at The Employment
Law Group.
1
See infra Part II-III (discussing the history and origins of wrongful discharge claims
in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia).
2
See infra Part IV-VI (discussing the specific elements of wrongful discharge in
Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and the similarities and differences
between the claims in each jurisdiction).
3
See infra Part VII-XII (describing litigation in wrongful discharge cases including
defenses and damages stratified by offenses).
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II. HISTORY OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The doctrine of at-will employment first appeared as a statement in a
legal treatise by Horace C. Wood, Master and Servant § 134.4 In older
cases, courts frequently referred to the at-will doctrine as “Wood’s Rule.”
Not long after Wood’s treatise appeared, various courts began citing the
rule in his treatise.5 Thus, the rule quickly became accepted law.6 The
employment at-will doctrine is still law in the majority of states in the
country.7
The preference of laissez-faire capitalism and economic expansion of the
Industrial Revolution arguably influenced the creation of the at-will
doctrine.8 The new rule also afforded American courts a means by which to
develop their own common law rule and reject the English rule, which held
that an employment contract for an indefinite period extended for one year
unless there was reasonable cause for discharge.9
The at-will doctrine was almost universal at the beginning of the
twentieth century.10 The Supreme Court even temporarily afforded it
constitutional protection.11 However, the Court retreated from this position
4
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT. COVERING THE
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 272 (1877)
(affirming that American hirings are presumed to be at-will and indefinite unless the
servant can prove otherwise).
5
See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 886-87
(Mich. 1980) (describing Wood’s rule as one which creates a higher burden on the
servant to prove the existence of an express contract for an agreed upon term in order to
sustain a claim of wrongful termination).
6
See, e.g., McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 11 A. 176, 178-179 (Md. 1887)
(“[Wood’s treatise] is an American authority of high repute”); East Line & R.R.R. v.
Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (Tex. 1888) (stating that the generally accepted rule of
employment length, absent an unambiguous contract, is “at-will.”); Martin v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (“we think the rule is correctly stated by Mr.
Wood, and it has been adopted in a number of states.”); Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg.
Co., 43 A. 609, 610 (Del. Super. Ct. 1899) (“Wood . . . very clearly states the
difference between the rule which obtains in this country and the one in England, and I
can find it nowhere more intelligently and satisfactorily stated.”); Harrod v. Wineman,
125 N.W. 812, 813 (Iowa 1910) (“in this country it is held by an overwhelming weight
of authority that a contract of indefinite employment may be abandoned at will by
either party without incurring any liability to the other for damages. The cases are too
numerous to justify citation.”).
7
See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Disclaimers of Wrongful Discharge Liability: Time for
a Crackdown?, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1131, 1132 (1992) (arguing that all states recognize
at-will employment as dominating the employment field, and some even refuse to
recognize the exceptions discussed in this Article).
8
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Wis. 1983).
9
Id.
10
See id. (describing the dedication of the courts to the at-will employment doctrine
throughout the U.S.).
11
See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (holding unconstitutional an
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in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel
Corporation.12
After President Roosevelt’s New Deal economic programs,
“Government regulation in the workplace increased dramatically.”13
“Congress and state legislatures recognized the need to curtail harsh
application of the at-will doctrine and stabilize labor relations.”14 Just as the
United States began to understand the negative side effects and social costs
of the Industrial Revolution, so would courts realize that the at-will
doctrine could not operate blindly and unchecked.15
Eighty-two years after Wood first introduced the at-will doctrine, courts
began to carve out certain exceptions to the doctrine.16 They permitted an
action for wrongful discharge, more commonly referred to as wrongful
termination, when an employer’s decision to dismiss an employee
conflicted with some fundamental public policy of the state.17 The courts
held that they should not allow an employer to benefit, at the expense of an
employee, from a violation of an important public policy.18 The first court
decision to recognize the public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine was Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 396.19 The
court in Petermann held that an employer cannot discharge an at-will
employee because he failed to commit perjury upon its request.20 Doing so
would promote illegal conduct and inhibit the performance of justice,
neither of which would serve the public good. Judge Fox thus held that it
would be contrary to public policy to allow an employer to fire an

act passed by Congress that made it an offense for an interstate carrier to unilaterally
discharge an employee because of his membership in a labor organization); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (holding unconstitutional a Kansas state law making it
unlawful for employers to forbid employees from becoming or remaining members of a
labor organization).
12
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (stating that
Congress acted within its sphere of constitutional authority when it enacted the
National Labor Relations Act with the purpose of preventing employers from engaging
in unfair labor practices.).
13
See Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 837.
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., Peterman v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of Am., Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (“the right to
discharge an employee under [an employment] contract may be limited by statute.”).
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., id. (finding that the courts could not condone the at-will termination of an
employee by his or her employer based on the former’s refusal to commit a felonious
act, as it would be contrary to public policy).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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employee because the latter refused to commit a criminal act.21 Despite this
landmark decision, the Petermann case stood alone and ignored for many
years.22
Other state courts in the United States did not begin to affirm the public
policy exception to the at-will doctrine until almost two decades after the
Petermann opinion.23 One of the first bases for successful wrongful
termination claims was in a workers’ compensation statute. In Frampton v.
Central Indiana Gas Company,24 the court held that an employee fired for
exercising his statutory right to file a workmen’s compensation claim was
entitled to damages.25 In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,26 the court stressed that
Illinois’s workers’ compensation statute was a public policy of the state and
would only be effective if wrongfully discharged employees could maintain
a personal action for damages.27 In 1978 and 1979, Pennsylvania courts
confirmed causes of action for wrongful termination for taking time off
work for jury duty and for refusing to take a polygraph test.28
Two of the most influential wrongful termination cases came out in
1980. That year, the California Supreme Court, in Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Company,29 accepted the reasoning in Petermann and found that
an employer cannot discharge an employee for refusing to participate in an

21

Id.
See, e.g., Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (listing the state cases recognizing the public policy exception following
Petermann).
23
See, e.g., id.
24
291 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
25
See id. at 428 (proclaiming that a retaliatory discharge following a claim brought
under the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act is not acceptable and employees
terminated on this basis will have a private cause of action).
26
384 N.E.2d 353 (Ind. 1979).
27
See id. at 359 (stating that retaliatory discharge for filing of a workers’
compensation claim is a great offense against Indiana’s public policy, and that
requiring greater damages than compensation to the discharged employee may not
suffice to discourage the retaliatory practice so that punitive damages may be necessary
to maintain deterrence); see also Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that an employer is not free to discharge an employee for a
reason conflicting with public policy, including sex, race, religion, and retaliation for
participation in public social welfare programs); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d
1087, 1094-95 (Or. 1978) (holding that an employee discharged on the basis of his
application for workers’ compensation benefits was entitled to file for common law
remedies for wrongful discharge).
28
See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120-21 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1978) (holding that the availability for citizens to partake in jury duty is a recognized
and important public good, protected against at-will termination of employment and
that the plaintiff has a right to a stated cause of action for wrongful discharge under
Pennsylvania law); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir.
1979) (holding that an at will employee fired for refusing to take a polygraph test was
entitled to sue his employer for wrongful discharge under Pennsylvania law).
29
610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
22
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illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices.30 With language very similar to
that of Petermann, the court held that employers are not allowed to make
an employee’s employment contingent on the demand that an employee
engage in illegal conduct.31 Moreover, it held that if the employer attempts
to do so and discharges the employee for refusing, the employee may bring
a personal action for wrongful discharge against the employing company. 32
Also in 1980, the New Jersey Supreme Court composed its landmark
ruling in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.33 It found that “an
employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge
is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.”34 With this background, it
was not long until courts in and around Washington, D.C. joined the trend
in confirming the public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine.

III. ORIGINS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION ACTIONS IN MARYLAND,
VIRGINIA, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The first wrongful termination case in the region developed in
Maryland.35 After providing an extensive overview of case law on the topic
from around the county, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted a new
cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy in
Adler v. American Standard Corporation (hereinafter referred to as an
“Adler claim”).36 Though the court confirmed the ability to make a
wrongful termination claim in the state of Maryland, it found that the
plaintiff did not meet his burden when asserting that claim.37 Adler reported
illegal practices in the management of the company but failed to make the
case that the activities he reported were truly illegal (against public
policy).38 Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy recognized that modern economic
30
See id. at 1336-37 (holding that an employer may not coerce his employee to
commit illegal acts on his behalf and threaten discharge in the process).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
34
Id. at 512.
35
See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981).
36
See id. at 471 (explaining that a judicial decision can create a new cause of action,
especially when the court finds that current available remedies do not suit the needs of
the public).
37
See id. at 471 (describing Adler’s claim as “too vague, too conclusory, [and] too
general” to meet the prima facie burden of demonstrating that the conduct clearly
contradicted public policy).
38
Id.
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conditions differed significantly from those that existed during the birth of
the at-will doctrine. He considered:
When terminated without notice, an employee is suddenly faced with
an uncertain job future and the difficult prospect of meeting continuing
economic obligations. But this circumstance, of itself, hardly warrants
adoption of a rule that would forbid termination of at will employees
whenever the termination appeared “wrongful” to a court or a jury. On
the other hand, an at will employee’s interest in job security,
particularly when continued employment is threatened not by genuine
dissatisfaction with job performance but because the employee has
refused to act in an unlawful manner or attempted to perform a
statutorily prescribed duty, is deserving of recognition. Equally to be
considered is that the employer has an important interest in being able
to discharge an at will employee whenever it would be beneficial to his
business. Finally, society as a whole has an interest in ensuring that its
laws and important public policies are not contravened. Any
modification of the at will rule must take into account all of these
interests.39
In defense of its ability to create a new cause of action in Maryland, the
court opined that the at-will doctrine is “subject to modification by judicial
decision where this Court finds that it is no longer suitable to the
circumstances of our people.”40 Changing circumstances compel courts to
adopt new rules and create new law.41 The developing economic and social
landscape of the United States required such a change in Maryland law.
Virginia was next to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
termination.42 With little fanfare, the Supreme Court of Virginia confirmed
the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine in its 1985
decision of Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville (hereinafter referred to as a

39

Id. at 41-43 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Condore v. Prince George’s Co., 289 Md. 516 (1981); Kline v. Ansell,
287 Md. 585 (1980)).
41
See, e. g., Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560380 A.2d 611, 611-12 (Md. 1977)
(discussing the trending majority of state’s recognition of intentional emotional distress
as a basis for tort liability and analyzing the case to determine whether Maryland would
join those cases recognizing the tort); Deems v. Western Maryland. Ry. Co.,, 247 Md.
95231 A.2d 514, 521 (Md. 1967) (discussing the history of finding that a man’s right to
sue for the loss of his wife’s consortium was originally based on the belief that the
woman was the husband’s property, and admitting that, evolving views of women’s
rights may require a modification of this common law rule to allow women to sue as
well.
42
See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985) (deciding
to adopt the public policy exception and apply it when an employer discharged an atwill employee who was also a shareholder for exercising his right to vote).
40
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“Bowman claim”).43 In Bowman, the bank and its board of directors
discharged employees who exercised their rights as shareholders in
questioning the manner in which the bank obtained proxies.44 Ruling in
favor of the plaintiffs, Justice A. Christian Compton applied the public
policy exception to at-will termination, discussing a trend of state
recognition of the need for this exception.45 The court qualified that the
exception would only be narrowly applied in future at-will violation
cases.46
Interestingly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, not the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, first espoused the public policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Washington, D.C. In Ivy v.
Army Times Publishing Company,47 the Court of Appeals refused to rehear
an unpublished memorandum opinion that dismissed an employee’s
complaint.48 Following Taylor v. Greenway Restaurant, Incorporated49 and
Pfeffer v. Ernst,50 the panel held that either party could terminate an
employment contract of indefinite duration for any reason.51 It refused to
create an exception to this rule for terminations made in violation of public
policy.
In 1986, the District Court for the District of Columbia adopted the
Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in Pierce, holding that D.C.
acknowledged the public policy exception to at-will employment
termination.52 It compared the public policy exception for at-will
employment with D.C.’s public policy exception to at-will eviction in
landlord-tenant law, and reasoned that these causes of action should be
treated similarly.53 Two years later, however, the District Court in Hall v.
Ford54 found that the decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals in Ivy
confirmed that the District of Columbia did not, in fact, recognize a cause

43

331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985).
Id. at 799.
45
Id. at 800 (citing to multiple courts in other jurisdictions that have also recognized
the public policy exception).
46
Id. at 801.
47
428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981).
48
See id. at 831 (refusing to rehear the case without any supporting reasoning in the
court’s one paragraph opinion).
49
Taylor v. Greenway Rest. Inc., 173 A.2d 211 (D.C. 1961) (holding that a bartender
hired at a weekly rate could be terminated at any time and at the will of either party).
50
Pfeffer v. Ernest, 82 A.2d 763 (D.C. 1951) (stating that employment contracts
defining an employment time period are legally terminated at the will of either
employee or employer).
51
Ivy, 428 A.2d at 831.
52
Newman v. Legal Services Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D.D.C. 1986).
53
Id.
44
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of action for wrongful termination and disapproved the decision in
Newman.55
With the decision of Adams v. George W. Cochran & Company,56 the
D.C. Court of Appeals finally recognized a cause of action for wrongful
termination.57 In the Adams case, the defendant wrongfully discharged the
plaintiff after he refused to drive a truck that did not have an inspection
sticker on its windshield.58 The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.59 After
reviewing the history of wrongful termination in other jurisdictions,
including the landmark Petermann and Tameny decisions, the court
determined that it should “adopt a public policy exception to the general
rule that an at-will employee may not sue a former employer in tort for
wrongful discharge.”60 Similar to the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in
Bowman, the Adams court warned that they would confine the application
of the public policy exception to very narrow cases where an employee’s
refusal to violate the law was the exclusive cause for employment
termination.61
In 1997, the D.C. Court of Appeals expanded the Adams public policy
exception.62 In Carl, the plaintiff, a part-time nurse, alleged that her
employer terminated her because she advocated for patients’ rights and
against her employer’s interests and served as an expert witness in medical
malpractice cases.63 Ms. Carl did not violate any law, as Adams requires.64
Nevertheless, the court in Carl held that Adams did “not foreclose any
additional ‘public policy’ exceptions to the general rule that employment
contracts are always at will unless they expressly provide otherwise.”65
54

856 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
See id. at 267 (discussing past case law in the District of Columbia and finding that
no public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine has been recognized in
the jurisdiction).
56
Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1991).
57
See id. at 33 (adopting the public policy exception to the general at-will
employment rule in a case where a company discharged its employee for refusing to
break the law).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 34 (confining the application of the exception even further by attributing to
the employee the burden of proof that discharge was solely because of the refusal to
break the law).
62
See Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 189 (D.C. 1997) (ruling that the courts
could expand the public policy exception recognized in Adams when appropriate)
(hereinafter referred to as a “Carl claim”).
63
Id. at 160 (specifying that Ms. Carl testified before the Council of the District of
Columbia and testified as an expert witness for the plaintiff during the aforementioned
medical malpractice cases).
64
See id. at 162 (conceding that the specific exception set forth in Adams may not
apply to the plaintiff because her retaliatory firing was not illegal under the D.C. Code).
65
Id. at 160.
55
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Specifically, the Court decided that the past interpretation of the public
policy exception in Adams did not preclude this court from applying it to
other public policy exceptions when appropriate.66 The court commended
Judge Schwelb’s interpretation of Adams in Gray v. Citizens Bank,67 and
concluded that retaliatory termination of an employee for refusing to break
the law was not the sole illustration of the public policy exception.68
Rather, the courts should be careful to construe the public policy exception
narrowly to preserve the rule.69 The court thus held that nothing in Adams
precluded an application of the public policy exception to other sets of
facts.70
Therefore, employees in D.C. do not have to refuse to engage in illegal
conduct in order to have a cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.
IV. “A” IS FOR ADLER: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
MARYLAND
While Adler is the seminal case that confirmed a cause of action for
wrongful termination in Maryland, subsequent decisions established the
principal types of wrongful termination claims and the elements of a prima
facie case. Maryland courts hold that the public policy exception to the atwill doctrine applies in three distinct sets of circumstances: (1) where an
employee refused to violate the law, (2) where an employee exercised a
specific legal right, and (3) where an employee fulfilled a statutory duty.71

66

See id. (deciding that the restrictive view in Adams can be expanded).
Gray v. Citizens Bank, 602 A.2d 1096, 1098 (D.C. 1992) (Schwelb, J., concurring).
68
See id. (deciding that the public policy exception should not be so narrowly
construed as to allow for only one type of case, but that that question was not presented
in Adams).
69
See id. (stating that courts should be conscientious when applying the exception
and construe it narrowly).
70
See id. (holding that when it is warranted, the public policy exception could be
applied to situations outside of the Adams context).
71
See, e.g., Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 761 (Md. 1991)
(giving legal redress for retaliatory discharge for suing a co-worker for sexual
harassment culminating in assault and battery); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173,
1175 (Md. 1988) (holding that discharging an employee because they filed a workers’
compensation claim was against Maryland public policy); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton
Serv. of Baltimore, Inc., 632 A.2d 463, 471 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding that
carrying out a statutory duty to report child abuse or neglect is required by teachers and
that Maryland protects those teachers from any dismissal or discipline for reporting
such abuse); Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1148 (MD. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990) (holding that firing an employee for refusing to commit the tort of invasion
of privacy of a third-party was against public policy).
67
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A. Refusing to Engage in Illegal Activity
The Adler tort protects employees who were terminated because they
refused to engage in illegal activity. Cases construing this form of protected
conduct include:
1. Recognizing an Adler claim where an employee was discharged after
refusing to engage in sexual intercourse with her supervisor and thus
“becom[ing] her boss’s prostitute.”72
2. A human resources director alleging that she was terminated because
she refused to submit a false insurance claim for health insurance on behalf
of an individual who no longer worked for the company, an act that would
amount to health care benefit fraud.73
3. Recognizing an Adler claim where a resident manager of an apartment
complex was terminated because she refused to violate tenants’
constitutional right to privacy by carrying out instructions to enter tenants’
apartments and look through their private papers in their absence.74
4. Terminating an employee because she refused her supervisor’s
inducements to engage in prostitution.75

B. Exercising a Statutory Right
Terminating an employee for exercising her statutory rights can also give
rise to an Adler claim. Cases construing this form of protected conduct
include:
1. Terminating a teacher for exercising his First Amendment right by
speaking out about a guard’s unnecessary use of force to stop a fight
between inmates;76
72

See Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080, 1081 (Md. 2000)
(upholding the lower courts’ ruling and agreeing that retaliatory discharge was against
public policy when it applied to an employee who refused to commit acts of
prostitution).
73
See Magee v. Dan Sources Tech. Serv., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 258 (Ct. Spec. App.
Md. 2001) (holding that the employee provided sufficient evidence to establish a nexus
between the decision to discharge her and the public policy against health care benefit
fraud).
74
See Kessler, 572 A.2d at 1148 (holding that it was a violation of public policy to
fire an employee for refusing to commit the tort of invasion of privacy on behalf of her
employer).
75
See, e.g., Perry v. FTData, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 699 (D. Md. 2002) (holding that it
was against public policy for an employer to discharge an employee for refusing to
commit prostitution).
76
See, e.g., De Bleecker v. Montgomery Cnty, 438 A.2d 1348, 1354 (Md. 1982)
(holding that retaliatory discharge for constitutionally protected speech can give rise to
a private cause of action).
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2. Terminating an employee for refusing to submit to a polygraph test in
violation of Maryland Annotated Code Article 100, Section 95, which
prohibits lie detector tests as a condition of employment;77 and
3. Discharging an employee solely because the employee filed a
workers’ compensation claim. 78

C. Fulfilling a Statutory Obligation
Adler protects at-will employees who fulfill a statutory obligation of
reporting suspected criminal behavior to law enforcement.79 Under this
form of protected conduct, the employee must demonstrate that she had a
legal obligation or duty to report the employer’s unlawful conduct.80 Note
that in Wholey v. Sears Roebuck,81 the court cautioned against construing
this form of protected conduct broadly because the legislature has not
created a general whistleblower protection statute protecting employees
who investigate and internally report suspected criminal activity.82 Cases
construing this form of protected conduct include:
1. Recognizing an Adler claim where a former teacher at a childcare
facility claimed she was terminated for reporting instances of child abuse to
a state childcare licensing agency.83
2. A physicist alleging that his employment was terminated because he
intended to “blow the whistle” on the hospital’s practice of billing
Medicare for complex radiation calculation plans when less complex and
less expensive calculations were actually being performed, but who had no
statutory duty to report the hospital’s billing irregularities, failed to state
77
See, e.g., Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212, 216 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1985) (stating
that express legislative prohibition of termination of an employee for refusing a
polygraph is violation of public policy).
78
See, e.g., Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. 1988) (holding that
discharging an employee because they filed a workers’ compensation claim was against
Maryland public policy).
79
See Makovi v. Sherwin Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 182-83 (Md. 1989)
(discussing the cases reviewed in Adler and sorting them into three categories of: 1)
Refusing to Commit an Unlawful Act; 2) Performing an Important Public Obligation;
and 3) Exercising a Statutory Right or Privilege).
80
See, e.g., Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 494 (Md. 2002) (defining the
Legislatures intent as protection for reporting witnesses to be protected for complying
with this civil obligation).
81
803 A.2d 482 (Md. 2002).
82
See id. at 496 (describing the protection as limited to private employees reporting
the illegal activity externally).
83
See, e.g., Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Serv. of Baltimore, Inc., 632 A.2d 463, 46970 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1993) (describing the plaintiffs’ claims as relying on the
statutory reporting obligation).
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Adler claim.84
3. Employees alleging that their employer closed the plant in retaliation
for their cooperation in a state and federal prosecution for the employer’s
toxic waste dumping, could not maintain an Adler claim because CERCLA
provides its own procedure for employees to seek relief for such
retaliation.85
D. Elements of an Adler Claim
In order to establish a case of wrongful termination, the employee must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) her employer terminated
her; (2) her termination violated a clear mandate of public policy; and (3)
there is a causal nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employer’s
decision to fire the employee.86
V. “B” IS FOR BOWMAN: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
VIRGINIA
While Virginia first recognized an exception to the at-will employment
doctrine in Bowman, the Virginia Supreme Court in Rowan v. Tractor
Supply Co.87 confirmed that the “narrow” exception applies in only three
discreet circumstances: (1) the exercise of a statutory right, (2) the violation
of statutory protections, and (3) the refusal to engage in criminal conduct.88
Justice Lacy reasoned:
While virtually every statute expresses a public policy of some sort,
we continue to consider this exception to be a “narrow” exception and
to hold that “termination of an employee in violation of the policy
underlying any one [statute] does not automatically give rise to a
common law cause of action for wrongful discharge.” In only three
circumstances have we concluded that the claims were sufficient to
constitute a common law action for wrongful discharge under the
84
See, e.g., Thompson v. Mem’l Hosp. at Easton, Md., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 400, 410
(D. Md. 1996) (stating that because the plaintiff did not work in the billing department
and had no statutory obligation to report the billing irregularities, his claims were
“vague, conclusory and speculative”).
85
See, e.g., Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 629 A.2d 1293 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 1993)
(holding that the employer had not acted illegally by closing the plant, because private
actors are not bound by constitutional restraints protecting free speech rights).
86
See, e.g., King v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 901 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2005)
(discussing the qualifications for bringing a wrongful termination claim).
87
Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 63 S.E.2d 709 (Va. 2002).
88
Id. at 711.
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public policy exception.89
The first instance, as was the case in Bowman, is when an employer
violates a policy enabling an employee’s exercise of a statutorily created
right.”90
The second scenario that gives rise to a wrongful termination claim is
when an employer violates a public policy explicitly expressed in statute
and when the employee is a clear member of the class of persons the statute
intends to protect.91 The Bailey and Lockhart cases involved discharges
based on the public policy expressly stated in former Va. Code § 2.1-715.4
(currently codified in § 2.2-3900).92 That statute provided, in relevant part,
that it is Virginia’s policy to safeguard everyone from unlawful
discrimination in employment based on gender.93 The employees in these
cases alleged their employer terminated them because of their gender.94
The third and final circumstance is when an employer discharges an
employee for refusing to engage in a criminal act. The court in Rowan
recognized that “although criminal statutes do not contain explicit
statements of public policy, the protection of the general public from
lawless acts is an unquestioned policy underlying such statutes.”95
Therefore, allowing the employment-at-will doctrine to “serve as a shield
for employers who seek to force their employees, under the threat of
discharge, to engage in criminal activity” is the highest violation of public
policy.96 In Mitchem, the court upheld the plaintiff’s wrongful termination
claim based on her refusal to engage in a sexual relationship with her
supervisor and violate laws against fornication and lewd and lascivious
behavior.97
89

Id. at 111 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985) (holding
that an employer may not threaten to discharge an employee to control their vote as a
shareholder in a corporation).
91
See Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Va. 1997) (holding that the
employer’s discrimination against the plaintiff because she was a woman and a
working mother was against public policy as embodied in the Virginia Human Rights
Act); see also Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328, 332 (Va.
1994) (holding that discrimination and wrongful discharge based on race and gender
are against public policy and fit into the narrow exception described in Bowman).
92
Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505; Lockart, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
93
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (West 2011).
94
See Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505 (explaining that the plaintiff had been terminated
during her pregnancy because her employer found she was no longer a “dependable”
worker); Lockart, 439 S.E.2d at 332 (describing how one of the plaintiffs was
terminated because she refused the sexual advances of one of the managers).
95
Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Va. 2002).
96
Id. (citing Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2000)).
97
Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 249.
90
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There is no single case that sets out the prima facie elements of a
wrongful termination claim under Bowman. However, reviewing the court
decisions that followed Bowman, the necessary steps are the same as those
in Maryland. A plaintiff must establish (1) that her employer terminated
her, (2) that her termination violated a public policy of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, and (3) that there is a causal link between her termination and
the named public policy violation.98
VI. “C” IS FOR CARL: ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN D.C.
Although the D.C. Court of Appeals first acknowledged the existence of
a cause of action for wrongful termination in Adams, most employment
litigators refer to the action as a Carl claim because of the latter decision’s
expansion of the narrow exception Adams created.99 As explained above,
Carl held that an employee’s refusal to violate the law was not the only
circumstance under which an employee can assert a wrongful termination
claim.100
As in Maryland and Virginia, D.C. courts recognize three separate
categories of protected conduct under the exception to the employment atwill doctrine: (1) refusing to engage in illegal activity; (2) exercising a
constitutional or statutory right; and (3) reporting criminal conduct to
supervisors or outside agencies.101 In Fingerhut v. Children’s National
Medical Center,102 the plaintiff (1) refused to participate in his employer’s
bribe of a D.C. Government official, (2) performed his legal duty as a
security officer to inform government agencies of the bribe, and (3)
reported the bribe to both law enforcement and internal management.103
The court found that all of these activities afforded Fingerhut the ability to
defeat his employer’s motion to dismiss.104
The Adams and Carl decisions established the first two categories of
actions. In Adams, the court held that the exception applies when an
employer terminates an employee because of the employee’s refusal to
violate the law.105 In Carl, the Court of Appeals affirmed that an
employee’s exercise of her right to free speech, by means of her testimony
against her employer in malpractice cases, also serves as the basis of a
98

See Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 699 (Va. 1998); see also Eslami v.
Global One Comm’n, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 17, 18 (1999).
99
See also Fingerhut v. Children’s Nat. Med. Ctr., 738 A.2d 799, 805 (D.C. 1999).
100
Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 160 (D.C. 1997).
101
See Fingerhut, 738 A.2d at 803.
102
738 A.2d 799 (D.C. 1999).
103
Id.
104
See id. at 806–07.
105
See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991).
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wrongful termination claim.106
When originally asked to extend the exception to the employment at-will
doctrine to employees who report illegal activities, the Court of Appeals
refused to recognize such an expansion.107 However, Carl specifically
overruled the decision in Gray and held that the court is free to recognize
additional public policy exceptions.108 In dismissing a plaintiff’s Carl
claim, the court ruled in Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom,109 that the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate the existence of a legal
obligation to report to her superiors the improper conduct which she claims
to have observed.”110 The inference, therefore, is that a cause of action for
wrongful termination does exist upon the showing of such a duty to report.
Fingerhut confirmed this third category of claims in its decision the
following year.111
However, not all whistleblowing enjoys protection from retaliation under
the public policy exception.112 So far, the third category of wrongful
termination actions in D.C. appears to protect only the reporting of crimes
and the reporting of conduct when there are legal obligations to report such
conduct.
Though there is no case on point regarding Carl claims, the D.C.
Whistleblower Protection Act protects disclosures that the employee
“reasonably believes” to evidence one or more of the circumstances
delineated in D.C. Code § 1-615.52(6)(A)-(E).113 Also, as with
discrimination reprisal cases, it is not necessary that the employee be
correct in her disclosure. It is sufficient that the disclosing employee
“reasonably believes” that the disclosure is of an illegal, inappropriate,
unhealthy or unsafe practice.114 While these cases refer to statutory, rather
106

See Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997).
See Gray v. Citizens Bank of Washington, 602 A.2d 1096, 1097 (D.C. 1992)
(concluding that only the en banc court was free to expand the public policy exception
recognized in Adams and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on this basis).
108
See Carl, 702 A.2d at 160 (holding that the Adams decision did not bar the court
from expanding the scope of the public policy exception, even when the court was not
en banc, as was the case in Gray).
109
715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998).
110
Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998).
111
Fingerhut v. Children's Nat. Medical Center, 738 A.2d 799 (D.C. 1999).
112
See, e.g., Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 8 (D.C. 1993) (affirming the
dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim for abusive discharge for reporting maintenance
deficiencies to corporate managers).
113
D.C. Code § 1-615.52(6)(A)-(E) (protecting disclosures of information by
employees when about gross mismanagement, gross misuse or waste of public
resources or funds, abuse of authority in connection with the administration of a public
program or the execution of a public contract, violation of a federal, state, or local law,
or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety).
114
See id.; see also Zirkle v. District of Columbia, 830 A.2d 1250, 1260 (D.C. 2003)
107
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than common law causes of action, they are the most analogous to
wrongful termination claims.
D.C. courts do not explicitly outline the elements necessary to sustain a
cause of action for wrongful termination. However, by reading the
numerous cases deciding such claims, the requirements are the same in
D.C. as they are in the other two jurisdictions. A discharged at-will
employee may sue her former employer for wrongful termination when the
sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the law, as
expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.115 Current case law suggests
that an employee may prevail if the employee can show that her protected
activity was the “primary” or “substantial” reason for the discharge.116 The
Wallace court affirmed the dismissal of an employee’s wrongful
termination claim because she could not demonstrate that her employer
terminated her “solely, or even substantially for engaging in conduct
protected by such an exception.”117 In either standard, the burden of proof
is on the employee.118 The claimant must demonstrate (1) that her employer
discharged her employment, (2) that the discharge was a violation of public
policy, and (3) that a causal relationship exists between the discharge and
public policy violation.119
VII. TORT v. CONTRACT LEGAL BASES
Some jurisdictions analyze wrongful termination claims under a tort
theory, while others base the cause of action under contract law. Most
jurisdictions view the action as one in tort. The generally accepted reason
for recognizing the cause of action as a tort is that the action “vindicates an
otherwise civilly unremedied public policy violation.”120
States that consider wrongful termination to be a contract claim
(citing Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 283 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (stating that the
determination “hinges not upon whether the order was ultimately determined to be
illegal, but whether appellant reasonably believed that it was illegal.”).
115
Zirkle, 830 A.2d at 1260.
116
See, e.g., Wallace, 715 A.2d at 885 (“discharged solely, or perhaps even
primarily,”); Davis v. Gables Residential/H.G. Smithy, 525 F.Supp.2d, F.Supp.2d 87,
103 (D.D.C. 2007) (“sole or substantial reason”); Mastrangelo v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., CIV. 01-0582 (TFH), 2006 WL 416181 *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006) (“solely, or
at least substantially”).
117
Wallace, 715 A.2d at 886 n. 25.
118
Id.
119
See Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991); see also
Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of Apostolic Faith of Washington, D.C. v.
Beards, 680 A.2d 419, 433 (D.C. 1996).
120
Richard E. Kaye, Cause of Action for Termination of At-Will Employee in
Violation of Public Policy, 24 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 227 (2004 & Supp. March 2012)
(citing Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402 (2003)).
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understand it is an implied term of every contract of employment that
neither party may require another party to do what the law forbids.121
Courts can also use contract law to limit the size of an award to a prevailing
plaintiff.122 Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. courts all recognize wrongful
termination in violation of public policy as a tort action.123

VIII. ELEMENT ONE: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE
The first step in any wrongful termination action is to establish that an
employer discharged an at-will employee. Both Maryland and D.C. courts
acknowledge that employees who sign a collective bargaining agreement or
other form of employment contract still retain the protection of the public
policy exception.124 To varying degrees, all three jurisdictions permit
injured plaintiffs to assert that their employers constructively discharged
their employment in lieu of proving involuntary termination.125
A. Employment Contracts
Maryland courts hold that even employees who sign an employment
contract with their employer can file a wrongful termination suit. In Ewing
v. Koppers Co., Inc.,126 the court held that a union member subject to a
collective bargaining agreement could have a wrongful termination action
against his employer who terminated him for filing a workers’
compensation claim.127 In reaching this decision, the judge reasoned:
The tort action as we have recognized it is not intended to reach
every wrongful discharge. It is applicable only where the
121
See Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Ark. 2003) (citing Lucas
v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984)).
122
See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386-87 (Ark. 1988) (fixing the
measure of compensatory damages in a public policy wrongful discharge action to the
sum of wages the employee would have earned under the employment contract had she
not been discharged).
123
See Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 471 (Md. 1981); see also
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985); Adams v.
George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991).
124
Infra VIII. A. Employment Contracts.
125
Infra VIII. B. Constructive Discharge.
126
537 A.2d 1173 (Md. Ct. App. 1988).
127
Id. at 1174-75.
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discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy. Thus,
the public policy component of the tort is significant, and
recognition of the availability of this cause of action to all
employees, at will and contractual, will foster the State’s interest
in deterring particularly reprehensible conduct. Moreover, it
would be illogical to deny the contract employee access to the
courts equal to that afforded the at will employee. We hold that a
cause of action for abusive discharge exists in favor of employees
who serve under contract as well as those who serve at will. 128
However, in that particular case, the court found that an arbitrator’s
decision during the plaintiff’s union grievance preempted his ability to
bring a common law tort claim.129 Citing Ewing, the Maryland Court of
Appeals confirmed the availability of wrongful termination claims to union
employees in Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.130
Twenty years later, the D.C. Court of Appeals followed Maryland’s lead.
In Byrd v. VOCA Corp. of Washington, D.C.,131 the court found the
reasoning in Ewing persuasive. Referencing the decisions of California and
Washington courts, Judge Wagner opined:
The Maryland court’s reasoning is persuasive. Denying contract
workers the public policy wrongful discharge remedy tends to
“ignore . . . the fundamental distinction between tort and contract
actions.” The duty giving rise to the tort remedy is not derived
from the covenants of contract, but rather from the employer’s
obligation to conduct its affairs in conformity with fundamental
public policy. Recognition of the cause of action will, as the
Maryland court observed, “foster the State’s interest in deterring
particularly reprehensible conduct.” 132
The court in Byrd II, citing heavily to the Finch v. Holladay-Tyler
Printing, Inc.133 decision, also confirmed that Section 301(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) does not preempt tort actions for
wrongful discharge so long as the court need not interpret the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.134 Consequently, tort claims are separate
128

Id. at 1175 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1179.
130
Allen v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 547 A.2d 1105 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
131
962 A.2d 927 (D.C. 2008).
132
Byrd, 962 A.2d at 934 remanded to No. 2004-CA-004412-B, 2011 D.C. Super. Ct.
LEXIS 8 (Sept. 13, 2011) (“Byrd II”) (internal citations omitted).
133
586 A.2d 1275 (Md. 1991).
134
Byrd II, No. 2004-CA-004412-B at 67-68; see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
129
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and independent from the collective bargaining agreement.135
Maryland and D.C. courts agree that the public policy basis of the
wrongful termination tort rises above any concerns in contract law. While
there may be issues with preemption depending upon the terms of the
contract in question, the existence of any written agreement between an
employer and employee does not automatically foreclose the possibility of
a tort claim.
B. Constructive Discharge
Many states allow an employee to assert that the employer engaged in
conduct that compelled the employee to resign.136 In such circumstances,
the employee can demonstrate a constructive discharge even though the
employer did not terminate the employee. Constructive discharge is one
method of establishing an illegal adverse employment decision in many
civil rights and other employment law claims.
1. Maryland
In Maryland, employees do not need to prove their employers
involuntarily terminated their employment in order to allege wrongful
termination. Constructive discharge is sufficient to satisfy the first element
of the prima facie case.137 Evidence, for example, that the plaintiff resigned
after the employer offered the choice between resignation and termination
will establish the requisite discharge for a wrongful termination claim. 138
However, the plaintiff will need to show that the employer intended to
induce her resignation.139 Specifically:
135

See Byrd II, 2004-CA-004412-B at 36.
136 See, e.g., Gormley v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, 2005-NMSC-003, 109 P.3d 280,
282 (N.M. 2005) (“constructive discharge is a doctrine that permits an employee to
recast a resignation as a de facto firing, depending on the circumstances surrounding
the employment relationship and the employee's departure.”); LeGalley v. Bronson

Cmty. Sch., 339 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Mich. 1983) (“A constructive discharge occurs
‘when the employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.’”).
137
See, e.g., Beye v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1984) (“The law is not entirely blind . . . . [i]t therefore recognizes the concept of
“constructive discharge”; in a proper case, it will overlook the fact that a termination
was formally effected by a resignation if the record shows that the resignation was
indeed an involuntary one, coerced by the employer.”).
138
Kessler v. Equity Mgmt. Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1152 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
139
See Beye, 477 A.2d 1197, 1204 (holding that a plaintiff’s burden to prove
constructive discharge and an employer’s intent to coerce a resignation is not met
where plaintiff only contends that he was led to resign because he suffered from
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[W]here a resignation is purportedly prompted by working
conditions, the applicable standard to determine if the resignation
is, in effect, a constructive discharge, is whether the employer has
deliberately caused or allowed the employee’s working
conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonable person in
the employee’s place would have felt compelled to resign.140
It is the responsibility of the employee to prove constructive discharge
and the employer’s intent to provoke the resignation.
2. D.C.
Involuntary termination is also not the only form of discharge in D.C. A
constructive discharge will suffice to bring a tort action for wrongful
termination.141
Establishing constructive discharge before D.C. courts is less
troublesome than in Maryland. Specifically, an employee need not prove
the employer intended to compel the employee to resign. In D.C., “A
constructive discharge occurs when the employer deliberately makes
working conditions intolerable and drives the employee into an involuntary
quit.”142 However, nothing requires the employer to have intended to force
the termination.143 Working conditions rise to the requisite level of
intolerableness if they “would lead a reasonable person to resign.”144 There
is also no requirement that an employee remain in an “intolerable
workplace” for a particular period of time.145
3. Virginia
The Virginia Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether an
private, non-employment related attacks from fellow employees).
140
Id. at 1203 (emphasis added).
141
See Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1993) (affirming a
jury verdict finding in favor of an employee’s tort claim that her constructive discharge
constituted wrongful termination); see also Darrow v. Dillingham & Murphy, LLP, 902
A.2d 135, 138 (D.C. 2006) (holding that constructive discharge is a sufficient basis for
a wrongful termination action).
142
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. D.C. Comm. on Human Rights, 515 A.2d 1095, 1101
(D.C. 1986).
143
Id. (citations omitted).
144
Id.
145
Id.
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employment discharge can be constructive.146 Virginia Circuit Court judges
have reached different conclusions on the issue.147
In Jones v. Professional Hospitality Resources, Inc.,148 the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant constructively discharged her by giving her less
desirable tasks and reducing hours after she complained of unwanted
sexual advances.149 The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
Virginia public policy does not extend to constructive discharge.150 The
court stated:
The at-will employment relationship permits termination of
services by the employer or the employee, for any reason. When
the employee chooses to resign, no special rule applies. It is only
when the employer actually terminates the employee in violation
of some established public policy that the narrow exception is
applied. 151
However, the Virginia Supreme Court has recognized other causes of
action premised upon “constructive” conduct. For example, the court
created the doctrine of constructive desertion, which recognizes a ground
for divorce in favor of a party even though the guilty party did not actually
desert the marriage.152 Moreover, the court has judicially crafted
constructive evictions of tenants153 and constructive fraud.154
With this background, Virginia state and federal courts hold that “an
employee who can meet the high burden of proving a constructive
146
See Barron v. Netversant-Northern Virginia, Inc., 68 Va. Cir. 247 (2005) (citing to
appellate court decisions to support a constructive discharge claim and noting the
unresolved split in the state appellate circuits on the matter of whether constructive
discharge can be used as a basis for a wrongful termination claim).
147
Compare Jones v. Prof’l Hospitality Res., Inc., 35 Va. Cir. 458 (1995) and Wright
v. Donnelly & Co., 28 Va. Cir. 185 (1992) (holding that Virginia does not recognize
the tort of wrongful constructive discharge), with Dowdy v. Bower, 37 Va. Cir. 432
(1995), and Molina v. Summer Consultants, Inc., No. 152715, 1996 WL 1065653 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 1996) (holding that Virginia does recognize the tort of wrongful constructive
discharge).
148
35 Va. Cir. 458 (1995).
149
Id. at 458-59.
150
Id. at 460-62.
151
Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
152
Brooks v. Brooks, 106 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 1959); Williams v. Williams, 50 S.E.2d
277 (Va. 1948).
153
Cavalier Square Ltd. P’ship v. Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 435
S.E.2d 392, 395 (Va. 1993).
154
Mortarino v. Consultant Eng’g Services, Inc., 467 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Va. 1996);
Evaluation Research Corp. v. Alequin, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (Va. 1994).
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discharge does have standing to pursue a Bowman wrongful discharge
claim.”155 The Honorable Randall G. Johnson ruled in Peyton v. United
Southern Aluminum Products, Inc.,156 that constructive discharge is a viable
cause of action in Virginia.157 The Honorable Stanley P. Klein in Behsudi
also held that Virginia law should recognize wrongful constructive
discharge in the workplace. 158
In Behsudi, the court cited to a Fourth Circuit case when outlining the
elements of constructive discharge:
The United States Court of Appeals has recognized constructive
discharge in the workplace. In Bristow v. The Daily Press, Inc.,
the Fourth Circuit held that “a constructive discharge occurs when
‘an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working
conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job.” ‘In
order to satisfy the Fourth Circuit test, a plaintiff must allege and
prove two elements to establish a constructive discharge: (1) the
deliberateness of the employer’s action; and (2) the
intolerableness of the working conditions. Under this test,
deliberateness only exists if the employer intended to force the
employee to quit. Intolerableness of working conditions is reached
only when a reasonable person “in the employee’s position would
have felt compelled to resign.”159 When the countervailing
policies and authorities are fully considered, this Court finds that
wrongful constructive discharge in the workplace should be
recognized under Virginia law. 160
In order to sustain a cause of action for wrongful constructive discharge,
the Behsudi court held that a plaintiff must allege and prove by clear and
convincing evidence: (1) that the employer’s conduct was “so outrageous
in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community;” and (2) that the conduct compelling the resignation
violated a Virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute.161 The
availability of constructive discharge when asserting a Bowman claim
remains unsettled. To the extent Virginia courts accept the theory, they
155

Gochenour v. Beasley, 47 Va. Cir. 218, 222 (1998).
49 Va. Cir. 187 (1999).
157
Id.
158
Johnson v. Behsudi, 52 Va. Cir. 533, 538 (1997).
159
Id. (citations omitted).
160
Behsudi, 52 Va. Cir. at 538 (internal citations omitted).
161
Id. (citing Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 160 (1991); Ruth v. Fletcher, 377
S.E.2d 412, 412 (1989); Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806
(1996).
156
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follow the stricter standard of requiring a showing of intent on behalf of the
employer.
IX. ELEMENT TWO: SOURCES OF PUBLIC POLICY
The primary analysis courts conduct on any wrongful termination claim
is if the public policy violation the plaintiff alleges cites to a viable basis
for the cause of action. In addition to there being various sources of public
policy, each jurisdiction also establishes general limitations and
requirements when pleading wrongful termination claims.
A. General Limitations and Pleading Requirements
1. Maryland
Adler defined “public policy” as a “principle of the law which holds that
no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good.”162 In Maryland, the public policy cited
in support of a cause of action for wrongful discharge must represent a
“clear mandate of public policy.”163 The public policy in question must be a
“preexisting, unambiguous, and particularized pronouncement” that directs,
prohibits, or protects the conduct in question.164 In Wholey, the court
explained:
A public policy must be clearly mandated to serve as a basis for a
wrongful discharge action because that “limits judicial forays into
the wilderness of discerning ‘public policy’ without clear
direction from a legislature or regulatory source.” “When a
plaintiff fails to demonstrate that his or her grievance is anything
more than a private dispute regarding the employer’s execution of
normal management operating procedures, there is no cause of
action for [wrongful] discharge.” 165

162

Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981).
Id. at 471; see also Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590, 602 (Md. Ct.
App. 2003).
164
Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 788 A.2d 242, 245 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)
(citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 139 A.2d 642, 661 (Md. Ct. App. 2001)),
aff’d, 823 A.2d 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2003).
163

165

Wholey, 139 A.2d at 650.
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In other words, the public policy must be a specific, discrete, written
mandate and not an assumption or inference regarding the public good.
While there is no heightened pleading requirement for an Adler claim, a
plaintiff must plead with specificity the public policy the employer violated
by discharging the plaintiff.166 “A complaint must plead with particularity
the source of the public policy and the alleged violation.”167
A plaintiff must also show that her conduct advanced the public interest
supported by the policy or that the defendant’s conduct impaired that
interest.168 However, it is unlikely that an employee must demonstrate an
actual violation of public policy. The motivation behind an employee’s
conduct is also irrelevant. In Lawson v. Bowie State Univ.,169 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the personal motivation of a whistleblower
under Maryland Annotated Code, State Personnel & Pensions § 5-305 is
not grounds for denying whistleblower protections.170 Though Lawson
refers to a specific Maryland whistleblower statute, the rationale is
applicable to other similar causes of action, such as those under Adler.
While some jurisdictions have held that when the cited statute
establishing a public policy does not expressly cover an employee or an
employer no claim will lie, Maryland disagrees with this rule. For example,
the court in Molesworth v. Brandon171 determined that an employee can
maintain a claim against an employer that was too small for coverage under
the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”).172 Exempt
employers simply need not adhere to the administrative process of the Act.
They are not, however, exempt from the policy announced.
In some circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to ground a claim on a
public policy conferring rights on another person, not just the plaintiff
personally.173 However, Maryland courts will not hold an employer liable
166

See Denro, 605 A.2d at 1022 (holding that plaintiff failed to set forth with
sufficient specificity the allegations necessary to demonstrate that her employer
discharged her for refusing to violate two federal criminal statutes).
167
Porterfield, 788 A.2d at 245 (citing Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588
A.2d 760, 764-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Denro, 605 A.2d at 1022).
168
See Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
termination of employee for suggesting that she may want to seek advice of counsel
before responding to unfavorable work evaluation did not violate the public policy
generally favoring access to counsel).
169
26 A.3d 866 (Md. Ct. App. 2011).
170
Id. at 877; see also Horton v. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 279 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
that a government employee’s personal and vindictive motive in reporting his
supervisor’s misconduct is not relevant to the issue of whether the disclosure is a
protected disclosure under the Whistleblower Protection Act).
171
672 A.2d 608 (Md. Ct. App. 1996).
172
Id.
173
See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)
(holding that termination of apartment complex manager for refusal to “snoop” in
tenants’ apartments violated public policy because manager’s “snooping” would have
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when the policy identified by the plaintiff primarily benefits the
defendant.174 Nevertheless, only an “important” or a “strong” public policy
is actionable in Maryland.175 For example, a public policy favoring selfdefense is inadequate to support the claim of an employee discharged for
fighting.176
2. Virginia
Virginia courts define “public policy” as the underlying existing laws
designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or
welfare of the people in general. Therefore, the exception is not so broad as
to make actionable those discharges of at-will employees that violate only
private rights or interests.177 In Miller,178 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the private rights established by the employer’s internal regulations
had no impact upon any public policy. The plaintiff should attempt to show
that the right asserted benefits society as a whole rather than the plaintiff
individually.179
Furthermore, the employee stating a claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy must be an intended beneficiary of the public
policy in question.180 In Dray v. New Market Poultry Products, Inc.,181
employee April Dray was a quality control inspector at a plant that
processed and distributed poultry.182 Dray believed that the plant was not
violated tenants’ right to privacy under federal constitution).
174
See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 497-98 (Md. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that employer’s discharge of store employee for investigating suspected theft
by a store manager did not violate public policy since plaintiff had no public duty to
investigate the theft and only a duty to protect the store’s property which primarily
benefited the defendant).
175
Id. at 499 (holding that the public policy must be strongly supported by binding
authority).
176
See Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg. Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 312 (1995) (holding that
acting in self-defense is not protected by public policy).
177
See Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915, 918 (Va. 1987).
178
Id. at 915.
179
Id. at 919.
180
City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 523 S.E.2d 239, 245 (Va. 2000) (citing Dray v.
New Market Poultry Prod., Inc., 518 S.E.2d 312, 313 (Va. 1999)) (holding that the
plaintiff police officer was attempting to use the criminal code as a shield to protect
himself, not the public, from the consequences of his decision to charge his supervisor
with obstruction of justice despite the captain’s order to take no further action); see also
Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 709 (Va. 2002) (holding that the goal of the
obstruction of justice penalties is not to protect individuals from intimidation, but to
protect the public from a flawed legal system due to impaired prosecution of criminals).
181
518 S.E.2d 312 (Va. 1999).
182
Id.
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following proper sanitary rules and was distributing adulterated poultry.183
Dray informed government inspectors and was ultimately fired. Dray
brought a wrongful termination claim, asserting that her employer violated
the public policy underlying the Virginia Meat and Poultry Products
Inspection Act.184 The Court held that Dray had not stated a claim for
wrongful discharge because the statute in question only intended to
establish an intrastate regulatory mechanism for commerce, not protect “the
public good” generally.185 The Commonwealth’s public policy regarding
inspections of meat and poultry products did not create a protected class of
which Ms. Dray was a member.186
As in Maryland, a public policy sufficient to support a claim for
wrongful termination in Virginia must be clear and explicit.187 There is no
room for courts to interpret, extrapolate, or assume the legislature’s
creation of a public policy. The language of the statute in question should
be unambiguous. Similarly, the plaintiff should endeavor to establish with
as much specificity as possible the public policy in question and the
employer’s violative conduct.188
Recently, on November 1, 2012, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
a plaintiff could bring a wrongful discharge claim against an individual
who was not the plaintiff's actual employer, such as a supervisor or
manager, but who participated in the wrongful firing of the plaintiff.189 In a
complaint before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, Angela VanBuren alleged that both her employer, Virginia
Highlands Orthopedic Spine Center, LLC, and her supervisor, Dr. Stephen
Grubb, terminated her employment because she refused to engage in
criminal conduct, specifically adultery in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-365
and open and gross lewdness and lasciviousness in violation of Va. Code §
18.2-345. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified the
issue of individual liability under the tort for wrongful discharge to the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
In support of its holding that individual employees can be held liable for
their own conduct, the Court cited to previous decisions where Virginia
courts held individual supervisors and managers culpable for their actions
183

Id.
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
See Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 1996)
(holding that to succeed in a wrongful discharge action, employee must identify a
statutory basis for the identified public policy and that in the case of a dealership
employee’s refusal to repair an automobile because he felt the repair would be unsafe,
no such statute existed).
188
Id.
189
VanBuren v. Grubb, 120348, 2012 WL 5358706 (Va. Nov. 1, 2012).
184
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effecting the termination under review.190 Though not discussed in those
previous decisions, the legal theory behind individual liability is the wellsettled rule in Virginia that “employers and employees are deemed to be
jointly liable and jointly suable for the employee's wrongful act.”191 Under
tort law, agents and employees are personally liable for their own torts.
3. D.C.
In expanding the “very narrow” exception to the employment at-will
doctrine Adams created, Carl held that future requests to recognize such
exceptions should be only on a “case-by case basis.”192 The court ruled it
would “consider seriously only those arguments that reflect a clear mandate
of public policy—i.e., those that make a clear showing, based on some
identifiable policy that has been ‘officially declared’ in a statute or
municipal regulation, or in the Constitution, that a new exception is
needed.”193 Furthermore, there must be a “close fit” between the policy
cited and the employer’s conduct at issue.194 With that background, the
court in Carl rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to glean a public policy
exception from the rules of evidence and other sources related to expert
testimony in medical malpractice cases.195 Analogous to the decisions in
Maryland and Virginia, an employee in D.C. asserting a wrongful
termination claim will need to proffer a written, explicit public policy basis
and demonstrate that she is logically among those the public policy
purports to protect.
D.C. courts have been more lenient with regard to the pleading
requirements in wrongful termination actions. There is no case that requires
a plaintiff to plead the public policy an employer allegedly violated with
specificity. In Freas v. Archer Services, Inc.,196 the court found that though
the plaintiff did not plead a specific statutory provision in his original
complaint, “a complaint is sufficient so long as it fairly puts the defendant
on notice of the claim against him.”197 The test of sufficiency is not
190

See Bowman, 229 Va. at 540; see also Lockhart, 247 Va. at 106.
Thurston Metals & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 483–84; see also Miller v.
Quarles, 242 Va. 343, 347, 410 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1991) (“Both principal and agent are
jointly liable to injured third parties for the agent's negligent performance of his
common law duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.”).
192
Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1997).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
716 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1998).
197
Id. at 1002 (citing D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. §§ 8(a), (e); Scott v. District of
191

224

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:2

whether the plaintiff cited to a specific statute, but whether she informed
the defendant of the nature of her civil action.198 The Freas court ruled that
because the defendant had the opportunity to litigate the issue raised by the
public policy in question during its own motion to dismiss, it necessarily
had knowledge of the public policy basis of the plaintiff’s claim.199
B. Sources of Public Policy and Relationship with Other Statutes
Despite courts’ attempts to narrow and limit the scope of the public
policy exception to the at-will doctrine, the various sources of public policy
courts accept when reviewing wrongful termination claims continue to
expand. As described in Adler:
Nearly 150 years ago Lord Truro set forth what has become the
classical formulation of the public policy doctrine that to which
we adhere in Maryland: “Public policy is that principle of the law
which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good,
which may be termed, as it sometimes has been, the policy of the
law, or public policy in relation to the administration of the
law.”200
. . . But beyond this relatively indeterminate description of the
doctrine, jurists to this day have been unable to fashion a truly
workable definition of public policy. Not being restricted to the
conventional sources of positive law (constitutions, statutes and
judicial decisions), judges are frequently called upon to discern
the dictates of sound social policy and human welfare based on
nothing more than their own personal experience and intellectual
capacity. . . . Inevitably, conceptions of public policy tend to ebb
and flow with the tides of public opinion, making it difficult for
courts to apply the principle with any degree of certainty.201
The public policies outlined below are only a sample of the most popular
and most cited sources.
Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 323 (D.C.1985)).
198
Id.
199
Freas, 716 A.2d at 1002; see also Moore v. Moore, 391 A.2d 762 (D.C. 1978)
(“parties have impliedly contested a matter . . . [where] the party contesting the [matter]
received actual notice of the injection of the unpleaded matters, as well as an adequate
opportunity to litigate such matters and to cure any surprise from their introduction”).
200
Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L. Cas. 1, 196 (1853).
201
Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 471-72 (Md. 1981) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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1. State Statutes and Constitutions
The clearest undisputed source of public policy is state statue. State
legislative and regulatory acts are the most obvious manifestations of
public policy within a state.202 These include statutorily created rights,
criminal prohibitions, and liabilities for tort violations.203 In some states,
the only public policies courts recognize as sufficient to support a wrongful
discharge claim are those articulated in the state’s statutes, constitution, and
administrative regulations.
While this is not the case in Maryland, the majority of wrongful
termination cases in Maryland do cite to state statutes and regulations.204
Adler also protects employees who report crimes to government
agencies.205
In Carl, the D.C. Court of Appeals specifically recognized that an
employee could anchor a wrongful termination suit “either in the
Constitution or in a statute or regulation.”206 Applying that standard, the
court concluded that Carl made a sufficient showing to justify a public
202

See Adler, 432 A.2d at 472 (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306
(1930)) (“The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and
variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional
or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at
all, only with the utmost circumspection.”).
203
See, e.g., Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 495 (Md. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that retaliating against an employee who reported a crime as a witness is a
criminal offense and therefore a sufficient basis for a public policy in a wrongful
termination action); Kessler, v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1990) (recognizing the existence of a public policy pertaining to the tort of
invasion of privacy as having its source in both statutory and constitutional provisions).
204
See, e.g., Wholey, 803 A.2d at 57-60 (MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27, §§ 760-762 (now
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 9-301 to 9-304)); Insigna Residential Corp. v. Ashton,
755 A.2d 1080, 1087 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 27 § 15
(repealed 2001)); Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608, 616 (Md. Ct. App. 1996)
(citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 49B § 14 (repealed 2009)); Watson v. People Sec. Life Ins.
Co., 588 A.2d 760, 767 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 49B § 14-18
(repealed 2009)); Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. Ct. App.
1988) (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 101, § 39A (now MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §
9-1105)); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Serv. of Balt., 632 A.2d 463, 469 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1993) (citing MD. CODE ANN. §§ 5-502(b), 5-702(1), 5-704(a)); Kessler,
572 A.2d at 1149-50 (citing MD. CODE ANN. Art. 101, § 39A(a); MONTGOMERY
COUNTY CODE §§ 26(q), 29; MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 8-301 through 8-332, 8401); Moniodis v. Cook, 494 A.2d 212, 216-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (citing MD.
CODE ANN. Art. 100, § 95).
205
See, e.g., Bleich, 632 A.2d 463, 469-71 (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM.LAW §§ 5502(b), 5-702(1), 5-704(a)(2) (holding that a teacher’s allegations that her employer
terminated her for sending a letter to the state licensing specialist to report child abuse
or neglect were sufficient to support a wrongful discharge claim).
206
Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 162 (D.C. 1997).
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policy exception based on D.C. Code § 1-224 (now codified as D.C. Code
§ 1-301.43), which prohibits intimidating witnesses.207 The Adams court
cited to the municipal prohibition against operating a vehicle without a
valid inspection sticker as a valid source of public policy.208
The first recognition of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine
in Virginia cited to a shareholder’s statutory right to vote without
coercion.209 In Mitchem v. Counts,210 the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld
the plaintiff’s assertion that her employer wrongfully terminated her
employment after she refused to perform sexual acts in violation of
Virginia Code Annotated §§ 18.2-344 and 345, which prohibit fornication
and lewd and lascivious cohabitation.
2. Workers’ Compensation
Many different types of statutes may express a public policy sufficient to
support a wrongful termination claim. One class of such statutes includes
those that explicitly regulate the employment relationship. The clearest
example is a statute that prohibits an employee’s discharge under specified
circumstances, such as in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation
claim. This falls within the category of exercising a statutory right, which
all three states recognize. Wrongful termination claims based on employees
seeking workers’ compensation benefits were among the first wave of such
actions after courts first recognized the common law tort.
In order for a Maryland plaintiff to show that she came within the ambit
of the public policy protecting workers, she must show that she filed a
claim for monetary benefits arising from an injury sustained during
employment.211 In Ewing, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled:
Discharging an employee solely because that employee filed a
worker’s compensation claim contravenes the clear mandate of
Maryland public policy. The Legislature has made a strong
statement to that effect in making such conduct a criminal offense,
and our perception of the magnitude of the public interest in
preserving the full benefits of the worker’s compensation system
to employees, and deterring employers from encroaching upon
207

Id. at 165.
Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 33 (D.C. 1991) (citing D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 602).
209
See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985) (citing VA.
CODE 1950. § 13.1-32).
210
523 S.E.2d 246, 251 (Va. 2000).
211
See Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 586 A.2d 1275, 1278 (Md. Ct. App.
1991); see also Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 491–92 (Md. Ct. App. 2002).
208
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those rights, is equally strong.212
However, because of the language of Maryland’s workers’ compensation
statute, section 9-1105 of the Labor and Employment Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code,213 an employee must prove that the sole reason
for the discharge was the employee’s filing of a workers’ compensation
claim.214 Section 9-1105 states, in part, “An employer may not discharge a
covered employee from employment solely because the covered employee
files a claim for compensation under this title.”215 This is a higher standard
of causation than the “motivating factor” test outlined later in this paper.216
An employer’s termination of an employee for being absent from work
due to a work-related injury also comes within the protection of the public
policy safeguarding the right to workers’ compensation benefits. This is not
the case in Maryland when the employer applies an absence-discharge
policy without regard to an employee’s workers’ compensation status. See
Kern, 66 Md. App. 441. 217 When making this conclusion, the court held
that “an employee’s protection from discharge in retaliation for claiming
statutory benefits does not include protection for excessive absence from
work due to work-related injury.”218 Once an employee becomes disabled
and is no longer qualified to perform her job duties, an employer may
terminate that employee when the period of disability is not determinable.
In such cases, the inability of the employee to perform assigned
responsibilities, not the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits, serves
as the reason behind termination.
Virginia’s workers’ compensation statute is substantially similar to
Maryland’s. The statute reads, “No employer or person shall discharge an
employee solely because the employee intends to file or has filed a claim
under this title or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding under
this title.”219 It also requires the same “sole reason” causation standard.220
212

Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis
added).
213
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. EMPL. § 9-1105.
214
Kern v. South Baltimore General Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1986); Ewing, 537 A.2d at 1175.
215
§ 9-1105 (emphasis added).
216
See infra at 55, 56.
217
See Kern v. South Balt. Gen. Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
218
Id. at 452.
219
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-308(a).
220
See Jordan v. Clay's Rest Home, Inc., 483 S.E.2d 203 (Va. 1997) (“So the timing
of these events and the employer's knowledge that the employee was “reporting” the
injury, without more, does not raise an inference that the plaintiff was fired solely
because she intended to file a workers' compensation claim. Otherwise, a question of
fact on this issue would arise in every case merely upon proof that an employee had
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However, unlike the Maryland statute, the Virginia Code provides
employees with a private right of action in state circuit court.221
Consequently, a claim of retaliation for asserting workers’ compensation
rights does not fall within the gamut of a common law Bowman claim.222
The Virginia legislature passed section 65.2-308 in 1991, six years after
Bowman. While there are no cases holding that the statutory cause of action
under section 65.2-308(b) preempts a common law Bowman claim, there is
no evidence that anyone attempted to assert a wrongful termination claim
based on workers’ compensation rights prior to the enactment of section
65.2-308(b).
Like Virginia, D.C. courts recognize a statutory cause of action for
retaliatory discharge for filing, or attempting to file, a workers’
compensation claim.223 Section 32-1542 subjects an employer who violates
the section to paying between $100 and $1,000, and further provides that
the employee receives reinstatement and compensation for lost wages.224
To establish a claim, an “employee must prove that she made or attempted
to make a claim for worker’s compensation” and that her employer
discharged her in retaliation for making the claim. 225 An employee’s
attempt to make a claim for benefits is neither confined to the formal filing
of a worker’s compensation claim nor limited to claims for money.226
Nevertheless, not “every act by an employee ostensibly in pursuance of
compensation benefits constitutes a claim or attempted claim for
compensation.”227
Unlike Virginia, the D.C. Court of Appeals explicitly ruled that the
statutory provisions of D.C.’s Workers’ Compensation Act preclude an
employee from asserting a common law wrongful termination claim under
Adams and Carl.228 In so holding, the Nolting court reasoned:
. . . [W]e are dealing here with a statutory provision which not
only creates the wrong but also contains a specific remedy to
compensate the person suffering that wrong. No such statute was
involved in Adams; there was no administrative or other remedy
been fired after a work-related injury.”).
221
See Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-308(b).
222
See Shaw v. Titan Corp, 498 S.E.2d 696, 700 (Va. 1998); see also Dunn v. Bergen
Brunswig Drug Co., 848 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Va. 1994).
223
See Abramson Associates, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Dept. of Employment
Services, 596 A.2d 549, 552 (D.C. 1991); see also District of Columbia Workers’
Compensation Act § 43, D.C. CODE § 32-1542 (1980) (formerly D.C. CODE § 36-342).
224
Id.
225
Lyles v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs. (Lyles II), 572 A.2d 81,
83 (D.C. 1990).
226
Id.; Dyson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 566 A.2d 1065,
1067 (D.C. 1989).
227
Dyson, 566 A.2d at 1067.
228
See Nolting v. Nat’l Capital Group, Inc., 621 A.2d 1387, 1387 (D.C. 1993).
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available to the plaintiff. The injury to the plaintiff in Adams
would have gone uncompensated if the court had refused to
recognize a public policy tort. In the case sub judice, appellant
does not stand in that same position; she is not facing a situation
in which the only possibility for compensation for her claimed
injury is the recognition by this court of a public policy tort
expansive enough to cover her situation. 229
The issue of preclusion is outlined in more detail later in this paper.230
While all three jurisdictions protect employees from retaliation for
exercising their rights under state workers’ compensation laws, only
Maryland permits the use of those statutes in common law tort actions for
wrongful termination. Both Virginia and D.C. require plaintiffs to pursue
their statutory remedies in lieu of seeking tort damages.
3. Jury Service
Courts usually predicate recognition of a wrongful discharge claim for
jury service on the characterization of jury service as an important public
obligation or service.231 As with workers’ compensation rights, Maryland,
Virginia, and D.C. have all passed statutes prohibiting employers from
terminating an employee for complying with a court order to serve on a
jury.232
In Maryland, “An employer may not deprive an individual of
employment or coerce, intimidate, or threaten to discharge an individual
because the individual loses employment time in responding to a [jury]
summons…or attending, or being in proximity to, a circuit court for jury
service under this title.”233
Section 18.2-465.1 of the Virginia Annotated Code states, “Any person
who is summoned to serve on jury duty…shall neither be discharged from
employment, nor have any adverse personnel action taken against him,…as
a result of his absence from employment due to such jury duty.” 234
The statute in D.C. not only prohibits an employer from threatening or
otherwise coercing an employee because the employee serves as a juror,
229

Id. at 1389 (emphasis added).
See infra at 38, 60, 61.
231
See, e.g., Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or. 220 (1989).
232
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-501; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1; D.C.
CODE § 11-1913.
233
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-501.
234
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1.
230
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but also provides a cause of action for the recovery of wages lost if an
employer discharges an employee for serving as a jury.235
There are no state cases in any of the three jurisdictions regarding the use
of jury duty protective statutes as the public policy basis of a wrongful
termination suit. The only citations to any of the statutes listed above are
from federal court decisions in Virginia discussing section 18.2-465.1 of
the Virginia Annotated Code.
In Sewell v. Macado’s, Inc.,236 the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia refused to answer the question if the jury service statute
permits a claim of wrongful termination.237 It reasoned, “[A] federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction only is permitted to rule upon the state law
as it currently exists and not to surmise or suggest its expansion.”238
Conversely, the Eastern District of Virginia cited to section 18.2-465.1 as
one of the few bases on which an employee could assert a Bowman
claim.239 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit inferred its
support of the theory when it affirmed a lower court decision that the
plaintiff did not allege that her employer terminated her because she would
be absent from work, but because her employer did not like the fact she
was testifying against another employee.240 While these cases are not
binding on Virginia state courts, they mirror the trend across the country
that, by either statute or common law, employers cannot terminate
employees because of their jury service obligations.
4. Internal Policies and Suing the Employer
In most jurisdictions, an employer’s internal policies do not rise to the
level of a public policy that can form the basis of a wrongful termination
claim. Even if the employer terminates an employee after a false accusation
of conduct that violates company policy, the employee cannot generally
challenge the termination as repugnant to public policy.
This is the state of the law in both Maryland and Virginia. In Beery v.
Maryland Medical Laboratory, Inc.,241 the plaintiff claimed her employer
terminated her after a co-worker wrongly accused her of violating the
235

D.C. CODE § 11-1913.
No. Civ.A. 7:04CV00268, 2004 WL 2237074 (W.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2004).
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
White v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1549 (E.D. Va. 1990) aff’d, 939
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); Oakley v. May Dept. Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536
(E.D. Va. 1998).
240
Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 108 F. App’x. 110, 112 (4th Cir. 2004).
241
597 A.2d 516 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
236
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company’s policy against theft.242 According to the court, even if the
plaintiff had been guilty of the theft, her termination would have been
appropriate. “Firing her on the basis of a fellow employee’s unsubstantiated
allegations, without proof and, indeed, without fully investigating the
matter, may very well have been improper-even foolish-but can hardly be
said to contravene any clear mandate of public policy.”243
The Virginia Supreme Court similarly held that an employer’s
contravention of its own rules does not violate public policy.244 Thus, when
an employer terminates an employee for violating the employer’s rules or
because she expresses a disagreement with such rules, the employer will
not be liable.245 In Miller, the plaintiff appeared as a witness on behalf of an
employee before an internal grievance review panel.246 Two weeks later,
the employer terminated the plaintiff for unsatisfactory performance. 247 The
court reasoned:
In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the employer’s act in
discharging her was done in retaliation for her exercise of the right
given to all employees by SEVAMP’s “Personnel and
Administrative Procedures” manual to file grievances and to
testify freely before grievance review panels. But such a retaliatory
act would impinge only upon private rights established by the
employer’s internal regulations. It would have no impact upon any
public policy established by existing laws for the protection of the
public generally.248
There is no D.C. court decision regarding the viability of a Carl claim
based on an employer’s own internal policies. However, given the
limitation of wrongful termination claims to violations of a “clear mandate
of public policy,” such as those “officially declared in a statute or
municipal regulation,” there is no reason to believe D.C. courts would rule
differently than their counterparts in Maryland and Virginia.249
Absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy, there
ordinarily is no violation when an employer discharges an at-will employee
242

Id. at 519.
Id. at 523.
244
See Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915 (Va. 1987) (refusing to recognize a
public policy violation based on a right to file grievances as the right was primarily
created by the employer’s handbook).
245
Id. at 919.
246
Id. at 916.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
249
Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C. 1997).
243

232

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:2

in retaliation for that employee’s suit against the employer.250 In Watson,251
the Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with other states, holding, “There
is no clear mandate of public policy which would make actionable Peoples’
discharge of Watson if that discharge were motivated solely by Watson’s
initial claims against Peoples.”252 However, “a retaliatory discharge in
response to an employee’s seeking legal redress against a co-worker
because of . . . assault and battery” does satisfy the requirement of a clear
mandate of public policy under Adler.253 There are no known cases in
Virginia or D.C. on this issue.
5. Discrimination
No one can argue that safeguards against discrimination in the workplace
reflect a valid and enforceable public policy. To this effect, Congress and
the legislatures in Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. have all passed statutes
prohibiting employers from discriminating against their employees.254
However, those same statutes provide specific relief for discriminatory and
retaliatory discharges that, in many cases, preclude common law tort
actions.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 255 provides in
section 2000e-2 that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discharge any individual…because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”256 Section 2000e-3 also
prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee for opposing a
discriminatory action or making a charge of discrimination.257 Congress
later passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”),258 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),259 to
protect employees from discrimination and retaliation based on age and
250

See Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So.2d 761 (Ala. 1982); Becket v. Welton Becket &
Assocs., 114 Cal.Rptr. 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers,
506 A.2d 379, 380 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
251
Watson v. People Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
252
Id. at 765-66.
253
Id. at 767.
254
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991); Md. Code
Ann., State Gov’t § 20-601 to 20-609 (2009); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 to 2-1402.12
(2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 to 2.2-3902 (2001) (formerly VA. CODE § 2.1-715);
VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (1985).
255
42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
256
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
257
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
258
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967).
259
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12117 (2008).
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disability, respectively. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency responsible for enforcing these
acts, has established administrative procedures that claimants must follow
to assert their rights under these statutes.
Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. each have their own local
antidiscrimination statutes. These statutes cover the same protected classes,
and often more, than those of their federal counterparts. Maryland passed
the Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”)260 in 1965. D.C. enacted the
Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”)261 in 1977. Virginia created the Virginia
Human Rights Act (“VHRA”)262 and Virginians with Disabilities Act
(“VDA”)263 in 1987 and 1985, respectively. Since these statutes contain
their own administrative and legal remedies, they are generally not able to
serve as a basis for common law wrongful termination claims.
Maryland courts hold that the source of the policy against discrimination,
such as hostile work environment sexual discrimination, is statutory and
“exclusively statutory.”264 The court reasoned that state statutes provide the
remedies for their violation. Thus, the wrongful termination tort would not
reach an employer’s retaliation if the employee based her suit on
discrimination, hostile work environment, or other prohibited acts.265 In
Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., the plaintiff filed a tort action for
wrongful termination after receiving the EEOC’s notice of her right to
sue.266 Makovi alleged that her employer based her dismissal on sex
discrimination in violation of federal law and FEPA.267 The court held that
the tort of wrongful termination is unavailable where a statute that carries
its own remedy expresses the public policy to be vindicated.268 Because
Title VII and FEPA provided a remedy for Makovi’s alleged employment
discrimination, “the generally accepted reason for recognizing the tort, that
of vindicating an otherwise civilly unremedied public policy violation,

260
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-601 to 20-609 (2009) (original version at MD.
CODE ANN., Art. 49B).
261
D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 to 2-1402.12 (2006).
262
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 to 2.2-3902 (2001) (original version at VA. CODE §
2.1-715).
263
VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (1985).
264
Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 766 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
265
See id. (citing Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hosp., Inc., 578 A.2d 766 (Md. Ct.
App. 1990)) (holding that the existence of statutory federal and state remedies for
discharge of an employee in retaliation for reporting allegedly illegal discrimination
claims preempt tort claim for abusive discharge); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
561 A.2d 179 (Md. Ct. App. 1989).
266
Makovi, 561 A.2d at 180.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 609.
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[did] not apply.”269
Despite Makovi, the Maryland Court of Appeals “left open the prospect
of an action for abusive discharge lying when the discharge violated a
mandate of public policy independent of the employment discrimination
laws.”270 In Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton,271 the plaintiff argued her
employer wrongfully terminated her employment because she refused to
acquiesce to a form of quid pro quo sexual harassment that would have
amounted to an act of prostitution under Maryland Annotated Code, Article
27, Section 15.272 The court explained:
Preclusion under Makovi, we iterated, applies only when the
public policy sought to be vindicated “is expressed in a statute
which carries its own remedy for vindicating that public policy.”
Preclusion was not mandated, however, simply because the
assault and battery arose out of workplace sexual harassment. We
explained that public policy, manifested in both the civil and
criminal law, provided sanctions against the harmful and offensive
touching of the person, whether or not sexually motivated, long
before either Title VII or Art. 49B was enacted, and that, had
those statutes never been enacted, that independent mandate of
public policy would have supported [a plaintiff’s] recourse against
the co-worker. Thus, we noted, there were “multiple sources of
public policy, some within and some without Title VII and [Art.
49B]” and that, “[b]y including prior public policy against sexual
assaults, the anti-discrimination statutes reinforce that policy; they
do not supersede it.” 273
Watson, the precursor to Ashton, similarly held that discharging an
employee for pursuing legal action for workplace sexual harassment is
against public policy.274
Various federal court decisions in D.C. hold that antidiscrimination laws,
such as the DCHRA, can serve as the public policy basis of a common law
wrongful termination claim.275 These rulings, however, are not binding on
269

Id. at 626.
Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080, 1084 (Md. Ct App. 2000)
(emphasis added).
271
Id. at 1080.
272
Id. at 1081 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27 § 15 (2000) (current version at MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-301)).
273
Id. at 1086 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 768 (Md. Ct. App. 1991)).
274
Watson, 588 A.2d at 766.
275
See MacNabb v. MacCartee, 804 F. Supp. 378, 381 (D.D.C. 1992) (citing Buttell
v. Am. Podiatric Med. Assoc., 700 F. Supp. 592, 600 (D.D.C. 1988) (“Discrimination
based on age, like discrimination based on race or gender, is a violation of the clear
mandates of public policy”); Alder v. Columbia Historical Soc’y, 690 F. Supp. 9, 17
(D.D.C. 1988) (“[P]laintiff’s claims [of race and gender discrimination], if proven,
270
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D.C. “state” courts.276
Contravening the holdings of the U.S. District Court for D.C., the D.C.
Court of Appeals held that the DCHRA preempts the public policy
exception to the employment at-will doctrine. In Carl, the seminal case in
D.C. on the common law tort, the court opined:
The Council [of D.C.], of course, has shown that it knows how to
cover a field; we would be entirely off base if we were not to
conclude that the Council had preempted, for example, the legal
fields represented by the exhaustive list of Human Rights Act
prohibitions against discrimination in employment, or the
comprehensive Rental Housing Act rules governing evictions of
tenants at will, or the detailed Workers Compensation Act
provisions addressing on-the-job injuries. 277
In McManus v. MCI Communications Corp.,278 the court confirmed that
it already rejected the argument that a wrongful termination claim does not
rise when there is an alleged statutory violation.279 Having previously
concluded that the employer did not violate the employee’s rights under the
DCHRA, the McManus court ruled there was no room to make the
argument again under Carl.280
Virginia court decisions mirror those of Maryland and D.C. In Doss v.
Jamco,281 the Virginia Supreme Court held that “in amending the [VHRA]
by adding subsection D to Code section 2.1-725 in 1995,282 the General
Assembly plainly manifested its intention to alter the common law rule
with respect to ‘[c]auses of action based upon the public policies reflected
in [the VHRA].’”283 Subsection D states, “Causes of action based upon the
public policies reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those
would appear to implicate a statutorily expressed public policy, defendants’ motion to
dismiss the wrongful discharge claim is denied”)).
276
Though D.C. is not a state, it maintains its own court of general jurisdiction, the
Superior Court of D.C., and appellate court, the D.C. Court of Appeals. For issues of
local, not federal, law, the D.C. Court of Appeals is the highest court and court of last
resort in D.C.
277
Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 171 (D.C. 1997) (emphasis added).
278
748 A.2d 949 (D.C. 2000) (regarding a wrongful discharge claim based on racial
and personal appearance discrimination).
279
McManus, 748 A.2d at 957.
280
Id. (citing Freas v. Archer Servs., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. 1998) (“there is
no need to apply the Carl rationale because the legislative policy [in the statute
allegedly violated] is explicit and may apply directly to [appellee’s] alleged discharge
of [appellant]”).
281
Doss v. Jamco, 482 S.E.2d 441 (Va. 1997).
282
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725 (1995) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.22639(D) (2011)).
283
Doss, 492 S.E.2d at 446.
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actions, procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or
state civil rights statutes or local ordinances.”284
Following Doss, the court next addressed the scope of the VHRA in
Conner v. National Pest Control Association.285 There, the plaintiff alleged
that she had asserted a valid cause of action for wrongful termination
because, in addition to the public policy against gender discrimination in
the VHRA, her employer’s conduct violated the same public policy
embodied in sources other than the VHRA, such as Title VII. 286 The court
disagreed, holding that “the General Assembly eliminated a common law
cause of action for wrongful termination based on any public policy which
is reflected in the VHRA, regardless of whether the policy is articulated
elsewhere.”287 However, in line with the Ashton decision in Maryland,
Virginia courts permit wrongful termination claims related to, but not
specifically covered by, the VHRA.288
6. Public and Occupational Health
While safeguarding the health of the public at large should be a clear
source of public policy, court rulings on the issue are mixed. Most states,
including Maryland and Virginia as well as D.C., maintain numerous
statutory provisions that intend to protect the health of their residents.
Those explicit statutes can serve as the public policy basis of a wrongful
termination claims. Absent an explicit mandate, however, most courts
refuse to recognize a general public policy exception.
In Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc,289 the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland denied an employee’s wrongful termination claim
based on the state’s interest in promoting a health care system that provides
financial and geographic access to quality health care at a reasonable cost
to all citizens.290 The employee, a doctor and Director of Medicine, raised
concerns regarding the hospital’s refusal to pursue certain goals of a
previously expressed strategic plan, reductions in the hospital work force,
delays in X-ray and laboratory reporting, and lack of effective mechanisms
284

§ 2.2-2639(D).
513 S.E.2d 398 (Va. 1999).
286
Id. at 399. (“Specifically, Conner relied on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e”).
287
Id. at 400.
288
See Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246 (Va. 2000) (holding that an employer’s
termination of an employee for refusing to engage in a sexual relationship violated the
Commonwealth’s public policies against fornication and lewd and lascivious behavior
embodied in Code §§ 18.2-344 and 345).
289
614 A.2d 1021 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
290
Id. at 1033-34.
285

2013]

THE ABCS OF COMMON LAW WRONGFUL TERMINATION

237

for communication between the hospital and its staff.291 After bringing
those issues to the attention of the Medical Executive Committee, the
hospital terminated the complainant.292 In denying the employee’s Adler
claim, the court found, “While a quality health care system accessible to all
is undoubtedly a desirable goal, appellant’s assertion that it represents a
well-established public policy finds no support in any specific Maryland
legislation.”293
The Hrehorovich court cited primarily to Lee294 as the basis of its
decision. In Lee, the employer discharged the employee after the employee
protested deviations from proper testing procedures and attempts to deceive
a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) inspector.295 The employee
alleged that her termination contravened a federal public policy of
“promotion of maximum achievable safety in air transportation.”296 The
court concluded that the employee’s dispute with her employer was private,
notwithstanding her allegation of an “amorphous [public] policy concern”
of safety in air transportation.297
On July 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
dismissal of a wrongful termination claim based on violations of federal
regulations on drug labeling; 298 the Federal Trade Commission Act299 and
the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.300 Debra Parks alleged that
Alpharma’s marketing of Kadian, a slow-release form of morphine, as
compatible with other opiates and failure to note on the drug’s label that it
should not be taken with alcohol posed a danger to public health.301 The
Court held that the federal and local statutes and regulations cited did not
create a clear mandate of public policy.302
291

Id. at 1024.
Id.
293
Id. at 1034.
294
Lee v. Denro, 605 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
295
Id. at 1020.
296
Id.
297
Id. at 1024-25 (concluding that the employee failed to prove that she was
discharged in violation of a clear mandate of public policy of the state and that the
discharge was nothing more than a private employer-employee dispute).
298
See Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 25 A.3d 200, 203 (Md. 2011) (dismissing Parks’
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Parks
failed to prove her employer violated a clear mandate of public policy necessary to
sustain a cause of action for wrongful termination).
299
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
300
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-301 (2011).
301
Parks, 25 A.3d at 206 (describing Parks’s claim that the pharmaceutical company
fired her in retaliation for expressing her concerns about the lack of appropriate
warnings on the drug’s label).
302
Id. at 214-16 (citing Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 490-91 (Md. Ct.
App. 2002)).
292
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The Consumer Protection Act . . . does not provide the specificity
of public policy that we have required to support a wrongful
discharge claim. The extent of the public policy mandate
contained in the Act supports the breadth of its enforcement, but
undermines its utility in the context of a wrongful discharge claim,
for, as said in Wholey, “policies should be reasonably discernible
from prescribed constitutional or statutory mandates,” to ensure
that our decisions to extend the tort of wrongful discharge
emanate solely from “clear and articulable principles of law.” 303
Again, the Court wanted a specific expression of public policy, not a
broad or general mandate attempting to protect the public good.304
Regarding occupational safety, Maryland relies upon statutory causes of
action. The Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (“MOSHA”)
promulgates state safety and health regulations in the workplace and
incorporates corresponding federal regulations.305 Under section 5-604(b)
of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Annotated Code:
An employer or other person may not discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because the employee: (1)
files a complaint under or related to this title; (2) brings an
action under this title or a proceeding under or related to this
title or causes the action or proceeding to be brought; (3) has
testified or will testify in an action under this title or a
proceeding under or related to this title; or (4) exercises, for
the employee or another, a right under this title.306
An employee who believes her employer discharged or otherwise
discriminated against her in violation of this act can only submit a
written complaint to the Commissioner of Labor and Industry. 307
Consequently, common law wrongful termination claims under Adler
are unavailable for employees who raise occupational safety and health
concerns.308
Nothing in MOSHA purports to give an employee any private
right of action in court for violation of a health and safety
standard. Indeed, even for a violation of § 43, expressly
303

Parks, 25 A.3d at 214.
Id.
305
MD. CODE ANN. § 5-101 to 5-1001 (2011).
306
§ 5-604(b).
307
§ 5-604(c)(1).
308
Id.
304
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prohibiting an employer from discharging or discriminating
against employees for exercising rights under MOSHA, the
remedy afforded is a complaint to the Commissioner, who
alone is authorized to file an action to restrain the violation
“and for other appropriate relief including rehiring or
reinstatement of the employee to his former position with
back pay.309
Maryland federal courts set the stage for this decision. In Meadows v.
Container Research Corp.,310 Judge Young held that “the exclusive remedy
for a MOSHA related wrongful discharge” was under section 5-604 and
that a tort action under Adler did not exist for such a discharge.311
Similarly, the Virginia General Assembly provides a statutory cause of
action for any employee terminated for filing a safety or health complaint.
Under section 40.1-51.2:1 of the Virginia Annotated Code, regarding the
safety and health of working conditions:
No person shall discharge or in any way discriminate against
an employee because the employee has filed a safety or health
complaint or has testified or otherwise acted to exercise rights
under the safety and health provisions of this title for
themselves or others. 312
Under statute, an employee must first submit a complaint to the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry.313 Only if the Commissioner refuses
to issue a charge against the employer can the employee seek redress from
the courts.314 Given this statutory cause of action, there is no need to rely
upon Bowman and the common law tort of wrongful termination. However,
there is no statute or case that specifically precludes a Bowman claim based
on this section of the Virginia Code.
In D.C., health regulations without statutory remedies can serve as the
basis of a Carl claim. In Washington v. Guest Services, Inc.,315 the Court of
309

Silkworth v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 520 A.2d 1124 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
Id. at 1127.
311
Meadows v. Container Research Corp., No. Y-82-3353, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17371 (D. Md. 1983).
312
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.2:1 (2011); see also Ligon v. Cnty. of Goochland, 689
S.E.2d 666, 669 (Va. 2010) (explaining Virginia courts generally do not recognize a
common law tort claim for retaliatory discharge, but the State has provided a statutory
remedy for employees discharged for filing a safety or health complaint).
313
§ 40.1-51.2.2 (“The employee shall be prohibited from seeking relief under this
section if he fails to file such complaint within the 60-day time period.”).
314
Id.
315
718 A.2d 1071 (D.C. 1998).
310
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Appeals retroactively applied the holding in Carl and overruled the
Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer:
The health and food regulations which we have cited…are
expressions of a clear public policy proscribing, in the interest of
public health, the preparation, service or sale of adulterated or
contaminated food. Conduct that imperils the health and safety of
the elderly residents of a retirement home, who, as a group, are
particularly vulnerable to the kind of practice here alleged, is
obviously contrary to the public policy of this jurisdiction, and
Guest Services has not seriously argued the contrary.316
The plaintiff in Washington instructed a coworker to cease spraying
stainless steel cleaner in the area where the plaintiff was preparing food for
the employer’s elderly residents.317 The plaintiff also informed her
coworker that her actions were in violation of several laws and
regulations.318 The plaintiff’s supervisor overheard this conversation and
terminated the plaintiff the next day for insubordination.319 The court found
that foreclosing such a cause of action would undermine the purposes of
food and health regulations.320
As in Maryland and Virginia, the Council of the District of Columbia
also establishes local laws regarding occupational safety and health.321 Also
in line with the other two jurisdictions, D.C. law prohibits employers from
retaliating against employees because they filed complaints or participated
in proceedings under applicable laws.322 Aggrieved employees may file
retaliation complaints with the D.C. Occupational Safety and Health

316

Id. at 1080 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1072.(explaining that Washington worked as a cook in a retirement home
and knew that the stainless steel cleaner was poisonous and that many of the residents
were in ill health, and was therefore concerned about the health implications from
having the spray come in contact with the food).
318
Id. at 1023.
319
Id. at 1072-1073 (describing how Washington’s employer had told the co-worker
to spray the cleaner and thought that Washington’s order to her co-worker to stop
spraying was insubordination).
320
Id. at 1080 (“[T]o permit an employee to be fired for such actions would
undermine the purposes of the food and health regulations and would frustrate the
public policy of which these regulations are an expression.”).
321
D.C. CODE §§ 32-1101 to 32-1124 (2011).
322
See § 32-1117(a) (“No person shall discharge or discriminate against an employee
because an employee has filed a complaint, instituted or caused to be instituted a
proceeding pursuant to this chapter, testified or is about to testify in a proceeding,
exercised a right afforded by this chapter on behalf of the employee or others, or
performed any duty pursuant to this chapter").
317
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Commission.323 Employees may seek judicial review of the Commission’s
decision by the D.C. Court of Appeals.324 Though there is no case on point,
D.C. courts will likely not entertain common law wrongful termination
claims citing only to D.C. occupational safety and health regulations.
7. State and Federal Wage Claims
In general, state and federal statutes regarding minimum wage and
overtime cannot serve as the basis of a wrongful termination claim.
However, Maryland courts recently found a small corollary to this rule.
In Chappell,325 the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the existence of
remedy under Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) precluded an atwill employee from making a common law tort claim for retaliation.326 The
court also determined that the availability of a civil remedy under the
FLSA when there was no similar remedy under Maryland law also
precluded the possibility of an Adler claim.327 The Court of Special
Appeals reaffirmed the Chappell decision in Shabazz v. Bob Evans
Farms.328
In a recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
added an interesting twist to the preemption doctrine. In Randolph v. ADT
Security Services, Inc.,329 the court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’
wrongful termination claim despite their simultaneous FLSA retaliation
count.330 Judge Chasanow opined:
Thus, it may be that, if Plaintiffs have a viable cause of action
under the FLSA, the tort of abusive discharge would not be
available to them. Counts I [FLSA Retaliation] and II [Wrongful
323

§ 32-1117(b) (providing that an employee who believes that he or she has been
discharged or otherwise discriminated against must file the complaint within 60 days of
the discriminatory violation).
324
§ 32-1117(d) (“An employer or employee aggrieved by a decision rendered by the
Commission pursuant to this action is entitled to review by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in accordance with § 2-510.”); see infra Section X.A. regarding
preemption. See also infra Section XI A.
325
Chappell v. S. Maryland Hosp., Inc., 578 A.2d 766 (Md. 1989).
326
Id. at 774 (holding specifically that the existence of civil remedies under federal
and state law precluded the application of a tort remedy to his discharge action).
327
See id. at 773-74; see also Magee v. Dansources Technical Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d
231 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
328
Shabazz v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 881 A.2d 1212, 1224 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2005). (holding that the statutory remedy created by Article 49B (the Maryland statute
prohibiting employer discrimination), provided an exclusive remedy and precluded a
tort claim against individual supervisors for back pay).
329
701 F. Supp. 2d 740 (D. Md. 2010).
330
Id. at 749.
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Termination], then, would then be considered alternative theories
of recovery.331
While this decision does not overrule the holding that federal and state
statutory remedies preclude state common law claims, under the theory of
alternate pleading, it permits plaintiffs to defeat a motion to dismiss
potentially preempted claims.332
8. Federal Statutes and Regulations
The ability to cite to state statutes and regulations as sources of public
policy is well settled and uncontroverted. Various courts recognize that
federal public policy may properly form the basis for a wrongful
termination suit in state court.333 Maryland and D.C. courts concur.334 The
courts in other jurisdictions, such as Virginia, do not extend the sources of
public policy to include federal statutes and regulations.
Maryland federal court, in the similarly titled Adler v. Am. Standard
Corp. (“Adler II”),335 found that federal statutes could serve as the basis for
a wrongful termination claim because no Maryland state court ruled
otherwise.336 Conversely, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found that federal regulations do not constitute Maryland public policy for
the purpose of an Adler wrongful termination claim.337 While these federal
decisions are not binding on state courts, they are representative of the
mixed decisions of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
331

Id. at 748.
See id.
333
See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 579 (D. Md. 1982)
(citing McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1117-19 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Cal. 1980); Harless v. First National
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 272-73 (W.Va. 1978)) (holding that in an abusive discharge
action under Maryland law, violations of federal law may form the basis for the public
policy contravened by the discharge).
334
Adler 538 F. Supp. at 572; De Bleecker v. Montgomery Cnty, Md, 438 A.2d 1348
(Md. 1982); Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990);
Lee v. Denro, 605 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Wholey v. Sears, Robuck,
803 A.2d 482 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Liberatore v. Melville Corp., 168 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir.
1999); MacIntosh v. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l, 355 F. Supp. 2d 223
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
335
Adler, 538 F. Supp. at 572.
336
Adler, 538 F. Supp. at 578-79 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)).
rev’d on other grounds Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
337
See Szaller v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding
employer did not violate a clear mandate of Maryland public policy by allegedly
discharging employee for reporting alleged violations by the employer of Food and
Drug Administration regulations addressing the proper collection of blood).
332
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When creating the common law tort of wrongful termination in violation
of public policy, the Adler I court cited to cases that confirmed applicability
of federal public policies.338 Specifically, the court outlined:
In Harless v. First National Bank, discharge of an at will bank
employee in retaliation for the employee’s efforts to force the
bank to comply with state and federal consumer credit laws was
held to be actionable because the discharge contravened a
“substantial public policy principle” the protection of consumers
covered by the state and federal legislation.339
However, the court neither outright confirmed nor denied that federal
statutes constitute public policy in Maryland. It simply pointed out that it
did not “confine…itself to legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions
or administrative regulations when determining the public policy of this
State.”340 This ambiguity led to some confusion in Maryland state and
federal courts. However, a review of pertinent case law leads to the
conclusion that the definition of public policy does include federal laws.
Some Maryland state courts reviewed federal statutes as the basis of a
public policy exception without stating that they did, in fact, constitute a
public policy of Maryland. In a footnote in Lee,341 the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland admitted, “We assume without deciding that an
employee can base a claim for wrongful discharge under Maryland law on
an asserted violation of public policy exhibited by violation of federal
statutes.”342 The plaintiff argued that his employer violated federal fraud
and obstruction of justice statutes, specifically, sections 1001 and 1505 of
the title 18 of the United States Code.343 Ruling on the substance of those
claims, the court found that the plaintiff did not state a claim for wrongful
termination because she did not allege how her employer affirmatively
attempted to silence her or persuade her to lie to an FAA inspector.344
Though the court stated that an employee could use a federal statute as the
public policy basis of a wrongful termination claim, it disclaimed that it did

338
Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 468 (Md. 1981) (citing Tameny, 610
P.2d at 1330; Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275-76).
339
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275).
340
Id. at 472; see also Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760 (Md.
1991).
341
Lee v. Denro, Inc., 605 A.2d 1017 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
342
Id. at 1021. (citing Phipps v. Clark Oil and Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
343
Lee, 605 A. 2d at 1021-22.
344
Lee, 605 A. 2d at 1022.
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not decide the matter and limited its assumption to a footnote.345 Such
opinions are dicta and do not create binding precedent.
In King, the same court held that “ERISA section 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140,
provides a remedy for employees who are terminated for reporting
corporate wrongdoing to the proper authorities…[and] does not provide
protection for intra-employment conduct…[or] a remedy to appellant.”346 If
ERISA, a federal statute, did not qualify as a public policy in Maryland,
there would have been no need for the court to review the content of the
federal statute to determine if it applied to the appellant’s assertions.
However, Maryland courts were not always so coy and subtle in
expanding application of Adler to include federal public policy. In Magee,
the plaintiff argued that her discharge was in retaliation for her refusal to
violate the healthcare fraud provisions of section 24 and 1347 of title 18 of
the United States Code.347 This federal statute makes it a crime to
knowingly defraud a healthcare benefit program.348 Because the court
found no civil remedy that would provide the plaintiff redress for
retaliation, it held she could state a claim under the public policy
exception.349 In response to the defendant’s argument that the federal
statutes did not rise to the level of an applicable public policy, Judge Akins
opined:
We disagree. This criminal statute could not be clearer; it
constitutes a strong and clear public policy mandate against filing
fraudulent health insurance claims. Thus, Magee’s evidence of
health care benefit fraud satisfied the second “unvindicated public
policy mandate” element of an abusive discharge cause of
action.350
Given these three decisions, there is sufficient support that Maryland
accepts federal statutes as public policy within the state, so long as those
federal statutes do not carry their own remedial measures.
Constitutional provisions and principles also provide clear public policy
mandates applicable to wrongful discharge claims.351 In DeBleecker,352 the
345

Lee, 605 A. 2d at 1021.
King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (citing King
v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003).
347
Magee v. Dansources Technical Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 257 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2001).
348
18 U.S.C. § 24 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012).
349
Magee, 769 A.2d at 257.
350
Id.
351
See Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 492 (Md. Ct. App. 2002)
(“Constitutional provisions and principles also provide clear public policy mandates,
under which a termination may be grounds for a wrongful discharge claim.").
346
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Maryland Court of Appeals held that the employment at-will doctrine was
inapplicable if the discharge was a result of an employee’s exercise of his
constitutionally protected First Amendment rights.353 Similarly, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland recognized a public policy exception based
on a citizen’s right to privacy in Kessler.354 Kessler’s employer, an
apartment complex, terminated Kessler after she refused to enter the
apartments of tenants whose rent was overdue to “snoop” through private
papers in search of information regarding their place of employment,
wages, etc.355 The court held that there existed both statutory and
constitutional protections against such invasions of privacy.356
The inability to cite to federal statute as the source of a public policy
exception to the at-will doctrine is clear in Virginia. A Bowman claim must
rest upon Virginia public policy, not federal statute.357 In Bailey,358 the
Virginia Supreme Court opined:
That contention makes interesting rhetoric, but it disregards the
settled law that any narrow exception to Virginia’s employmentat-will doctrine must be based on a specific Virginia statute in
which the General Assembly has established a public policy that
the employer has contravened. And, as I have said, there is no
Virginia statute expressly prohibiting defendant’s conduct.359
In Lawrence, to which Bailey cites, the court explained:
In Bowman and Lockhart, the plaintiffs, who were permitted to
pursue causes of action against their former employers, identified
352

De Bleecker v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland,438 A.2d 1348, 1353 (Md. 1982).
Id. at 1352-53. De Bleecker was employed by Montgomery County as a teacher at
a detention center, and alleged he was dismissed for speaking out about a guard’s use
of violent force to quell an altercation. De Bleecker alleged this was a violation of his
constitutional right to free speech. Id. at 1349.
354
Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1150-1151 (Md. Ct. of Spec. App.
1990).
355
Id. at 1146-47.
356
Id. at 1149.
357
Oakley v The May Dep’t Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533, 535-36 (E.D. Va. 1998);
McCarthy v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Va. 1996); see
also Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 492 S.E.2d 441, 443-44 (Va. 1997); Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher,
480 S.E.2d 502, 505 (Va. 1997).
358
Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505.
359
Id. at 506 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Lawrence v. Chrysler
Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Va. 1996); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc.,
362 S.E.2d 915, 918-19 (Va. 1987); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d
797, 801 (Va. 1985)).
353
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specific Virginia statutes in which the General Assembly had
established public policies that the former employers had
contravened. Unlike the plaintiffs in Bowman and Lockhart,
Brooks does not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge
because he is unable to identify any Virginia statute establishing a
public policy that Lawrence Chrysler violated. We also reject
Brooks’ attempt to expand the narrow exception we recognized in
Bowman by relying upon so-called “common law duties of the
dealership.”360
Though Bowman does not explicitly state that Virginia statutes are the
only sources of public policy, the Virginia Supreme Court clarified in its
subsequent decisions that Bowman’s reliance on a specific Virginia statute
as the basis of the public policy exception tailored the cause of action to
derive from only state laws.361
Conversely, D.C. federal courts have consistently cited to federal statutes
and regulations as potential sources of public policy in wrongful
termination actions. In Liberatore v. Melville Corp.,362 the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed summary judgment
in favor of the defendant on a claim where the plaintiff alleged his
employer terminated him because he threatened to report the temperature
control problem in his pharmacy to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”).363 The plaintiff cited to FDA regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 210.1(b)
and § 211.142(b), as well as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.364 The jury
subsequently found for the plaintiff.365 More recently, in MacIntosh v.
Building. Owners and Managers Association International,366 the D.C.
federal court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
wrongful termination count that cited to the False Claims Act367 as the basis
of her Carl claim.368 The court held:
[Defendant] contends that plaintiff has not pointed to any specific
statute or regulation and has thus failed to establish a “clear
360

Lawrence, 465 S.E.2d at 809.
Oakley, 17 F. Supp. at 535-36; McCarthy, 999 F. Supp. at 829; Lawrence, at 809;
see also Doss, 492 S.E.2d at 443-44; Bailey, 480 S.E.2d at 505.
362
Liberatore v. Melville Corp., 168 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
363
Id. at 1327-28. The trial court dismissed Libatore’s wrongful discharge action for
failure to state a claim within the public policy exception set forth in Adams. Id. at 28
(citing Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991)).
364
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
365
Liberatore, 168 F.3d at 1328.
366
MacIntosh v. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass’n Int’l, 355 F. Supp. 2d 223 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
367
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
368
MacIntosh, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
361
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mandate of public policy” justifying an exception to the at-will
doctrine. In response, plaintiff identifies a federal statute, the
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000), that criminalizes
using false records or documents to induce the Government to pay
a fraudulent claim. Because plaintiff alleged that BOMA fired him
for refusing to inflate BOMA’s contractor expenses, plaintiff has
pointed to a clear mandate of public policy as expressed in a
federal criminal statute, satisfying both the broad standard
announced in Carl and the narrower rule from Adams.369
Most recently, in Myers v. Alutiiq Int'l Solutions,370 the D.C. District
Court held that the plaintiff’s reporting of wrongdoing in connection with
government contracting fell within the public policy exception to an at-will
employment relationship.371 It found that the federal statute at issue372
reflected a “clear public policy of encouraging government employees to
come forward and report possible problems in federal programs.”373 The
Myers court also cited to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”)374
The Superior Court of D.C. and the D.C. Court of Appeals have not
addressed the issue whether federal statutes can serve as the public policy
basis for a Carl claim. While there is no reason to infer that D.C. courts
would not follow in the steps of its federal counterparts, D.C. local and
federal courts have disagreed with each other in the past regarding the
recognition of the common law tort.375 Given the expansive interpretation
D.C. courts have afforded Carl, it is safe to assume, for the time being, that
federal statutes and regulations qualify as sources of public policy for
wrongful termination claims.

C. Other Sources of Public Policy
The above sections outline current case law on some of the sources of
public policy for wrongful termination actions in Maryland, Virginia, and
D.C. The topics above are by no means an exhaustive list of possible
369

Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
Myers v. Alutiiq Int’l Solutions, LLC., No. 10-2041, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
102013 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2011).
371
Myers, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102013 at 14.
372
5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2008).
373
Id. at 12.
374
Id. (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.505, 3.101-1, and 3.903).
375
Compare Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1981) and
Newman v. Legal Servs Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Hall v.
Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
370

248

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:2

sources of public policy, but include the most common sources. Because
the cause of action for wrongful termination is a common law claim, courts
can expand and reinterpret the elements and bases over time.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland confirmed this sentiment.
While it is possible that a clear mandate of public policy may exist
in the absence of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
pronouncement, this possibility “should be accepted as the basis
of judicial determination, if at all, only with the upmost
circumspection.” Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc., 64 Md.App.
55, 61-62, 494 A.2d 239 (1985) (quoting Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930)); see also Bagwell, 106 Md.App. at 49596, 665 A.2d 297 (“[R]ecognition of an otherwise undeclared
public policy as a basis for judicial decision involves the
application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of the case, a
practice which should be employed sparingly, if at all.” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lee, 91 Md.App. at 831,
605 A.2d 1017 (noting that, although “Maryland appellate courts
have decided several cases involving [wrongful] discharge claims
since Adler, they have never found such a claim to be stated
absent a discharge which violates a public policy set forth in the
constitution, a statute, or the common law.”)376
In Adler itself, the court pointed out that it did not “confine . . . itself to
legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions or administrative regulations
when determining the public policy of [the] State.”377 While Maryland and
D.C. may be more prone to expanding the definition of what constitutes
public policy, the courts in Virginia remain firm in their conviction that
only Virginia statutes can form the public policy basis of a wrongful
termination claim.
Some of the most influential alternate sources of public policy are codes
of professional ethics. New Jersey remains one of the only jurisdictions to
confirm that such codes qualify as an expression of public policy.378
Maryland, in Makovi, recognized that a code of professional ethics could

376
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wholey, 779 A.2d 408, 412 (Md. Ct. Spec App. 2001)
aff’d sub nom. Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 495 (Md. Ct. App. 2002)
(citations omitted).
377
Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981); see also Watson v.
People Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 766-67 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
378
See Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (holding that “in
certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public
policy" but excluding codes of ethics designed only to serve the interests of a
profession (as opposed to a public interest) and codes only concerned with technical
regulations).
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constitute a source of public policy.379 However, the court simply stated
generally that some courts have recognized a cause of action for employees
fired for “refusing to violate a professional code of ethics.”380 In Carl, the
D.C. Court of Appeals held that an employer’s termination of an employee
for acting in accordance with his or her personal moral beliefs does not
violate public policy.381 The court ruled that the a specific statute protecting
the right to testify before the legislature—not the general public policy
protecting the right to speak out—provided a concrete policy supporting a
wrongful termination claim. However, the court in Wallace appeared to
regard the Rules of Professional Conduct for members of the D.C. bar as
theoretically sufficient to create an applicable public policy.382 The court
ultimately found that no such rule required the plaintiff’s whistleblowing
conduct in that case.383
There are some creative avenues available to bring wrongful termination
claims based on codes of professional conduct and ethics in Virginia. For
example, plaintiffs can argue that Virginia’s recognition of the American
Nursing Association’s (“ANA”) Code of Ethics establishes that code as a
viable public policy basis for a Bowman claim. Section 54.1-100 of the
Virginia Annotated Code, confirms the Commonwealth’s authority to
regulate certain professions in order to protect the public interest.384
Nursing is an example of such a profession. Consequently, the Virginia
Board of Nursing maintains the ability to revoke a nurse’s license for
“practicing in a manner contrary to the standards of ethics.”385 The Virginia
Department of Health, Public Health Nursing program recognizes the ANA
Code of Ethics as a basis for its standards of practice. Therefore, the
Virginia Annotated Code, within its sections 54.1-100 and 54.1-3007, and
along with the regulations of the Virginia Department of Health,
incorporate the ANA Code of Ethics by reference. A plaintiff nurse
terminated for refusing to violate the ANA Code of Ethics can use these
references to support her wrongful termination claim under Bowman.
379

Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 182 (Md. Ct. App. 1989)..
Id. (citing Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1937 (1983)).
381
Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997).
382
Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 883 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1998).
383
Id. at 886.
384
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-100 (1988) (“The right of every person to engage in any
lawful profession, trade or occupation of his choice is clearly protected by both the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Virginia. The Commonwealth cannot abridge such rights except as a reasonable
exercise of its police powers when it is clearly found that such abridgment is necessary
for the preservation of the health, safety and welfare of the public.").
385
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3007 (2005).
380
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While there is no case law on point, this theory, and similarly creative
arguments, are worth testing before a judge.

X. ELEMENT THREE: STANDARD OF CAUSATION
The standard of causation in wrongful termination claims in Maryland,
Virginia, and D.C. is not overtly clear. A plaintiff can argue in all three
jurisdictions that she need only demonstrate that the defendant’s public
policy violation was a “motivating factor” in its decision to terminate her.
However, only Virginia courts provide a clear determination that this is the
proper standard. In Maryland and D.C., plaintiffs must infer the standard
from other case law.
In Maryland, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s motivation
for terminating her violated public policy.386 The Court of Special Appeals,
in its decisions in Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc.,387 and Bagwell,388 held
that a plaintiff must show that the reason for an employee’s discharge was
“wrongful.” In Townsend, the court concluded that the mere reliance on the
results of the polygraph test, even if the employer had wrongfully required
the employee to take the test, did not violate public policy.389 “Even if some
unlawful animus contributed to the ultimate employment decision, liability
does not necessarily attach,” particularly where the decision would have
been the same with or without the animus.390 Put another way:
The question is not whether discharging [the employee for his
arguably improper conduct] was fair, justified, sensible,
reasonable, or appropriate. Rather, the question is whether it was
wrongful, i.e., whether it violated a clear mandate of public
policy. Absent that type of violation, employers can discharge atwill employees for no reason or even for a bad reason.391
Case law regarding mixed cases and other forms of retaliatory discharge
hold that the plaintiff need only show that the unlawful motive was “a
motivating factor” for the discharge.392 The Heller court considered the
386

See, e.g., Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 823 A.2d 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2003).
Townsend v. L.W.M. Mgmt., Inc., 494 A.2d 239, 247 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
388
Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 311 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995).
389
Townsend, 494 A.2d at 247.
390
Brandon v. Molesworth, 655 A.2d 1292, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
391
Shapiro v. Massengill, 661 A.2d 202, 215 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); see also
Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 312.
392
See Brandon, 655 A.2d at 1306-07; see also Magee v. DanSources Technical
Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 253-54 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (agreeing that the
387
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burden of persuasion in an action for retaliatory discipline brought pursuant
to the Maryland Whistleblower Statute. Noting the statute provided that
“[t]his subtitle does not prohibit a personnel action that would have been
taken regardless of a disclosure of information,” it held that “[a]
whistleblower action by the employee intended to overturn a personnel
action . . . will succeed only if the employee shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that the protected disclosure was a ‘contributing factor’ in the
decision to take the personnel action.”393
Maryland courts, in a recent decision by the Court of Appeals, confirmed
that, whether “mixed” or “single” cases, the correct test for determining
retaliatory discharge claims is whether the protected conduct was a
“motivating factor” in the discharge.394 The court confirmed that the
Molesworth decision does not include a holding that a “but for” instruction
is required in a retaliatory discharge case. Furthermore, the court found that
a theoretical distinction between “single motive” and “mixed-motive” cases
is of no consequence whatsoever.395 Both courts concluded:
We believe Maryland law to be settled that a plaintiff’s burden is
to prove that the exercise of his or her protected activity was a
“motivating” factor in the discharge, thereby creating burdenshifting to the defendant. An instruction that imposes upon a
plaintiff the burden of proving that the exercise of his or her
protected activity was the “determining” factor in the discharge
from employment is a misstatement of the law, and erroneous.396
Virginia courts are clearer regarding an employee’s burden in Bowman
claims. In Shaw, 255 Va. at 542-43, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that
a plaintiff claiming wrongful termination must demonstrate that the reason
for discharge violated Virginia’s public policy.397
A plaintiff is not required to prove that the employer’s improper motive
was the sole cause of the wrongful termination.398 In reaching that
conclusion, the court differentiated the common law claim of wrongful
termination from the statutory cause of action under state workers’
Molesworth standard is a “motivating factor” and not “but for” causation); Dep’t of
Natural Res. v. Heller, 892 A.2d 497, 499,(Md. Ct. App. 2006).
393
Heller, 892 A.2d at 510 (citing MD. CODE, STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-302 (1997)).
394
See Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md, Inc., 960 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2008) aff’d sub nom. Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 17 A.3d 676
(Md. Ct. App. 2011).
395
Gasper, 17 A.3d. at 686.
396
Gasper, 960 A.2d at 1234; Gasper, 17 A.3d at 686.
397
Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 700 (1998).
398
Id.
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compensation laws. While section 65.2-308 of the Virginia Annotated
Code specifically forbids an employer from discharging an employee
“solely because the employee intends to file or has filed” a workers’
compensation claim, there is no similar requirement for common law
claims.
Virginia’s common law standard of proximate causation requires a
plaintiff to prove that her employer discharged her because of any
combination of unlawful factors. In such cases, the common law of
Virginia does not require the court to give the jury an explicit instruction
setting forth “but for” language.399 More recently, in Schmidt, et al. v.
Triple Canopy, Inc.,400 the Virginia Supreme Court explained that in a
common law wrongful discharge action the trial judge erred in instructing
the jury that the plaintiff must prove that their former employer’s illegal
motive for terminating them was the sole cause of the termination decision.
Instead, plaintiffs can prevail by demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence that the termination occurred because of factors that violate
Virginia’s public policy.
In Adams, the Court of Appeals of D.C. held that “a discharged at-will
employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when
the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the
law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.”401 The Wallace
court affirmed the dismissal of an employee’s wrongful termination claim
because she could not demonstrate that her employer terminated her
“solely, or even substantially for engaging in conduct protected by such an
exception.”402 Wallace’s allegations that other factors—such as
professional envy of her extensive credentials by colleagues, refusal to
cancel her daughter’s sixth birthday party, and reporting of five categories
of alleged wrongdoing—contributed to her discharge prevented her from
stating a viable claim for wrongful termination.403 In Carl, however, the
court upheld a complaint alleging that the employer discharged the plaintiff
for two discrete reasons—testifying before the D.C. Council against tort
reform and serving as an expert witness for plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases.404 The court did so even though it deemed only the first
of these reasons as sufficient to implicate a public policy exception.405
Though the Wallace court noted this change in judicial precedent, it refused
399

See Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 700-01 (Va. 1998).
No. 072556, Circuit Court No. CL-2006-0009565 (December 12, 2008).
401
Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991); see also
Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 883 (D.C. Ct. App.
1998) (emphasis added).
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Wallace, 715 A.2d at 886.
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Id. at 885-86.
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Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 165 (D.C. 1997).
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Id.
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to apply it to the case at bar.406 Neither Carl nor any other subsequent
decision has specifically overturned the determination in Adams that the
employer’s violation of public policy must be the sole reason from the
employee’s termination. In fact, the Superior Court confirmed the “sole
reason” standard recently in Byrd II.407 However, the plaintiff in Byrd II did
not attempt to argue a different standard, so that point was conceded.
Nevertheless, the decision in Carl inarguably interpreted Adams broadly
and permitted additional public policy exceptions.408 There is no reason
why plaintiff’s cannot argue that the Carl expansion of the common law
claim also broadens the strict “sole reason” standard of causation to include
the opportunity to please multiple, equally valid theories regarding the
employer’s motivations.
XI. DEFENSES
The primary defenses employers have to confront wrongful termination
claims are (1) available statutory remedies preempt the employee’s
common law cause of action, and (2) the employer had a separate,
legitimate reason to discharge the employee.

A. Preemption by Other Statutory Remedies
As the sections on workers’ compensation, discrimination, and
occupational safety and health above mention, employees cannot assert a
common law wrongful termination claim where there is a statutory civil
remedy on point. The purpose of the public policy exception is to provide
employees with a cause of action where an obvious wrong may stand
unpunished. Courts in all three jurisdictions confirm preemption of a
wrongful termination claim where a statutory action is available. The rule
in Virginia, however, is more nuanced.
Maryland courts named this preemption doctrine as the Makovi rule,
referring to Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.409 Makovi, in reviewing a case
of pregnancy discrimination, held that the common law tort is “inherently
limited to remedying only those discharges in violation of a clear mandate
of public policy which otherwise would not be vindicated by a civil

406

See Wallace, 715 A.2d at 890.
Byrd v. VOCA Corp. of Washington, D.C, No. 2004-CA-004412-B, 2011 D.C.
Super. Ct. LEXIS 8, 23 (Sept. 13, 2011).
408
See Bowie v. Gonzales, 433 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36 (D.D.C. 2006).
409
Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (Md. Ct. App.1989).
407
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remedy.”410 Title VII and Maryland’s FEPA, not Adler, was the plaintiff’s
proper cause of action. Where a statute expresses the public policy
foundation for an abusive discharge claim, and that statute already contains
a remedy for vindicating the public policy objectives, then judicial
recognition of an abusive discharge claim is both “redundant and
inappropriate.”411
Like any rule, the Makovi rule is not without its exceptions. In Makovi,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland admitted, “Sometimes the facts
underlying a discharge constitute both a violation of an anti-discrimination
statute and of another, more narrowly focused, statute reflecting clear
public policy but providing no civil remedy.”412 For example, the court
noted an Arkansas case where the plaintiff alleged her refusal to sleep with
her supervisor was a refusal to engage in prostitution, which carried
criminal, not civil, consequences.413 This was precisely the case in
Insignia.414 As outlined previously, Ashton argued that Insignia wrongfully
terminated her employment because she refused to acquiesce to a form of
quid pro quo sexual harassment that would have amounted to an act of
prostitution under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 11-301, et seq. The court
explained that the Makovi rule does not apply when an employer violates a
mandate of public policy independent from discrimination laws. Citing the
decision of Watson, the Insignia court confirmed that there is no preclusion
where an additional crime, such as assault and battery, arose out of
workplace sexual harassment covered by statute.415 Keeping with the
theme, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals refer to this exception to the
Makovi rule as the Watson and Insignia exception.416
The Virginia General Assembly went so far as to codify the preclusive
nature of statutory remedies when employees seek common law tort claims.
As mentioned previously, the Virginia General Assembly amended the
VHRA in 1995 to preclude “causes of action based upon the public policies
reflected in [the VHRA].”417 Virginia’s workers’ compensation statute
includes a similar provision. Under section 65.2-307 of the Virginia
Annotated Code, “The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee .
410

Id. at 180.
Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 629 A.2d 1293, 1300 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993);
see also King v. Marriott Inter. Inc., 866 A.2d 895, 904 (Md. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 489 (Md. Ct. App. 2002)).
412
Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2D 179, 187 (Md. Ct. App. 1989).
413
Id. (citing Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir.1984)).
414
Insignia v. Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. App. 2000).
415
Id. at 1086 (citing Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 760, 769 (Md.
Ct. App. 1991)).
416
See Magee v. DanSources Technical Servs., Inc., 769 A.2d 231, 256 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2001).
417
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2639(D) (2005).
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. . shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee.”418
However, Virginia courts have not explicitly held that the existence of
statutory remedies, as a general rule, precludes the availability of a
Bowman claim. In fact, Virginia courts have implied that the common law
public policy exception is separate and independent from statutory causes
of action. For example:
‘In order for the goal of the statute to be realized and the public
policy fulfilled,’ the Supreme Court recognized an exception to
the at-will doctrine.419 Later, in Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Virginia noted that Bowman applied a narrow
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine but fell far short of
recognizing a generalized cause of action for the tort of
‘retaliatory discharge.’420 Indeed, the General Assembly of
Virginia has enacted statutes providing a cause of action for
‘retaliatory discharge’ under specific circumstances (such as
discrimination against persons with disabilities;421 employees who
file safety or health complaints,422 and employees who make
workers’ compensation claims.423)424
Statutes that derogate from the common law “must be strictly construed
and not enlarged by construction beyond their express terms.”425 A
statutory change in the common law “is limited to that which is expressly
stated in the statute or necessarily implied by its language.”426 Thus,
“[w]hen an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the
common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its
terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule.”427 A plaintiff can
theoretically argue that the existence of other statutory remedies, without
418

VA. CODE ANN § 65.2-307(A) (1999).
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985).
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Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915, 918-19 (Va. 1987).
421
§ 51.01-41; § 51.01-46.
422
§ 40.1-51.2:1; 40.1-51.2:2.
423
§ 65.1-40.1.
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Shields v. P C-Expanders, Inc., NO. 119505, 1993 WL 946038 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr.
15, 1993); see also Kerns v. Shirley Well Drilling, 11 Va. Cir. 15 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1986)
(emphasis added).
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Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 142 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Va. Sup. Ct.
App.1965); see also Williams v. Matthews, 448 S.E.2d 625, 627-28, (Va. 1994);
Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861 (Va. 1992).
426
Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250-51 (Va. 2000) (citing Boyd v.
Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (Va. 1988); Strother v. Lynchburg Trust &
Savings Bank, 156 S.E. 426, 428-29 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1931)).
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Boyd, 374 S.E.2d at 302; see also Newport News v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E.
514, 520 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1936).
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explicit preclusion of common law claims, does not prevent her from
bringing those common law causes of action. The same conduct or
occurrence can support more than one theory of recovery.428 In sum,
Virginia courts have not ruled, outside of the explicit common law
derogations in the VHRA and workers’ compensation law, whether the
existence of a statutory remedy preempts a wrongful termination claim
under Bowman.
Similar to the Insignia decision in Maryland, Virginia courts permit
wrongful termination claims related to, but not specifically covered by,
statutes like the VHRA. In Mitchem, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
an employer’s termination of an employee for refusing to engage in a
sexual relationship violated the Commonwealth’s public policies against
fornication and lewd and lascivious behavior, embodied in Va. Code §§
18.2-344 and 345.429
Under D.C. law, the Carl exception to the at-will employment doctrine
does not apply when the very statute creating the public policy already
contains a “specific and significant remedy” for the aggrieved party. 430 In
Nolting,431 the Court of Appeals of D.C. held that an employee cannot
forego established administrative remedies and obtain recovery against an
employer on the tort theory of wrongful termination.432 The court
explained:
[W]e are dealing here with a statutory provision which not only
creates the wrong but also contains a specific remedy to
compensate the person suffering that wrong. No such statute was
involved in Adams; there was no administrative or other remedy
available to the plaintiff. The injury to the plaintiff in Adams
would have gone uncompensated if the court had refused to
recognize a public policy tort. In the case sub judice, appellant
does not stand in that same position; she is not facing a situation
in which the only possibility for compensation for her claimed
injury is the recognition by this court of a public policy tort
expansive enough to cover her situation.433
The court has held that other statutes with proprietary causes of action,
428
See Balzer and Assoc. v. The Lakes on 360, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 453, 455-56 (Va.
1995); Fox v. Deese, 362 S.E.2d 699 (Va. 1987).
429
Mitchem, 523 S.E.2d at 249-50.
430
Kakeh v. United Planning Organization, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2008)
(applying District of Columbia law).
431
Nolting v. Nat’l Capital Grp., Inc., 621 A.2d 1387 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993).
432
Id. at 1389.
433
Id. (emphasis added); see also Freas v. Archer Serv., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002-03
(D.C. Ct. App. 1998).
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such as the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code § 1-615.51, et
al., also preclude the creation of new public policy bases for wrongful
termination claims.434

B. Legitimate Business Reason
As with most employee protections, employers are able to defend against
a wrongful termination suit by asserting they had a legitimate business
reason when discharging an employee. Maryland federal court provides the
most poignant discussion on this topic. Reviewing a claim of retaliatory
discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim, the U.S. District Court
in Maryland held that “an employer who has mixed motives for discharging
an employee may avoid liability, provided one motive is legitimate.”435
This defense is not without limitation. An employer may not rely on two,
or more, unlawful motives to subvert the prohibition against discharging an
employee in violation of public policy. The federal court in Ford explained
that and employer may not avoid liability for terminating an employee for
mixed, but unlawful motives.436 The court rejected the employer’s
challenge to overturn a verdict in favor of the employee because doing
would absurdly “permit an employer to avoid liability in this unusual
situation by terminating an employee solely for wrongful reasons.”437
Therefore, an employer remains liable for wrongful discharge where the
motives include unlawful reasons.

XII. DAMAGES
Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. courts agree that a prevailing plaintiff in a
common law wrongful termination suit may recover economic,
compensatory, and punitive damages.
While the measure of damages in an action for wrongful discharge under
Adler is the employee’s salary for the remainder of the period of
employment, that is not the only remedy available.438 In Johnson v

434

See Carter v. Dist. of Columbia, 980 A.2d 1217, 1225-26 (D.C. 2009).
Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 647, 650 (D. Md. 1998) (interpreting
Kern v. South Balt. Gen. Hosp., 504 A.2d 1154 (Md. 1986) and citing Ayers v. ARA
Health Care Serv., Inc., 918 F. Supp. 143, 149 (D. Md. 1995)).
436
Ford, 999 F. Supp. at 649-651.
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Id.
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See Atholwood Dev. Co. v. Houston, 19 A.2d 706, 708 (Md. Ct. App. 1941).
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Oroweat Foods Co.,439 the Fourth Circuit held that the terminated
employee was entitled to recover expenses reasonably incurred in seeking
alternative employment.440 In Adler, the court refused to dismiss the
employee’s claim for punitive damages, thereby rejecting the employer’s
argument that it would be unfair to award such damages in the same case
where the underlying tort was for the first time recognized. As long as a
plaintiff can support a finding of malice on behalf of the defendant, a court
will permit the recovery of punitive damages.441 An employee must still
undertake to mitigate the damages by at least attempting, in good faith, to
secured subsequent employment.442
Under Bowman, a successful plaintiff is entitled to economic,
compensatory, and punitive damages.443 The court in Shaw outlined:
As we stated in Bowman, the common law cause of action for
wrongful termination of employment sounds in tort. Titan
conceded in the district court that this cause of action is an
intentional tort. When a plaintiff pleads and proves an intentional
tort under the common law of Virginia, the trier of fact may award
punitive damages. Thus, we conclude that, under Virginia law,
Shaw was entitled to recover punitive damages in the present
action, and we answer the second certified question in the
affirmative.444
As in Maryland, punitive (or exemplary) damages are allowable only
where there is malice on the part of the defendant.445 Where the aggrieved
injury is “free from fraud, malice, oppression, or other special aggravation,
compensatory damages only are allowed.”446
Similarly, D.C. courts may award lost pay, compensatory damages, and
punitive damages to a prevailing employee under a claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.447 To receive punitive damages, a
plaintiff must prove the defendant’s malicious intent by clear and
439
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Id. at 509.
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See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1151 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1990).
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See Wynne v. Birach, No. 1:09cv15, 2009 WL 36, at *72119 (E.D. Va. 2009))
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Shaw, 498 S.E.2d at 701(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Burruss v. Hines, 26 S.E. 875 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1897) (citing Norfolk & W.R.
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Id. at 877.
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convincing evidence:
To sustain an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed
a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evidence that the act
was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice
or its equivalent.448
XIII. PRACTICAL ADVICE AND CONCLUSION
A. Review Civil and Criminal Statutes
Many state and local legislatures have passed civil statutes protecting
employees from unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and termination.
Given the general rule that civil statutes with their own causes of action
preempt common law wrongful termination claims, it is essential to review
state and federal statutes before bringing a tort claim. One of the best ways
to avoid a preclusion issue is to find a criminal statute on point, such as
criminal prohibitions on prostitution and lewd behavior.449 Rarely do
criminal statutes include civil causes of action, and rarely will a court find
that a criminal statute does not espouse a public policy of the state.
B. Framing the Cause of Action
Frame the cause of action as “refusal to participate in unlawful activity”
instead of “reporting unlawful activity.” Many cases in Maryland, Virginia,
and D.C. clarify the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine is not a
general protections for “whistleblowers.”450
C. Forum Selection
Employees generally obtain higher verdicts in state court and are more
likely to survive summary judgment in state court. In addition, federal
448

Daka, Inc. v. McCrae, 839 A.2d 682 (D.C. 2003).
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450
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courts, including the Fourth Circuit, often construe wrongful termination
claims more narrowly than state courts. Accordingly, state court is the
preferred forum for litigating an Adler, Bowman, or Carl claim.
D. Discovery
In discovery, plaintiff should focus on developing evidence on the
following issues:
1. Direct evidence of retaliatory motive, such as an admission that the
decision-maker was angry at the employee for engaging in protected
conduct.
2. Close temporal proximity between the employee’s protected conduct
and the decision to terminate the employee.
3. Deviation from company policy or practice, such as singling out the
employee for extraordinary disciplinary action. For example, if the
employer disciplined the employee for sending an innocuous email to his
spouse letting her know that he is working late, and the company has not
disciplined other employees for sending inappropriate emails, the
disciplinary action taken against the employee will provide evidence of
disparate treatment.
4. Comparator evidence demonstrating disparate treatment.
5. Animus for the employee’s protected conduct. For example, the high
cost to the employer of complying with the law or regulation implicated by
the employee suggests employer animus. Conversely, develop evidence on
the revenue that the employer generated or expected to generate by
engaging in a fraudulent scheme about which the employee complained.
6. Falsity of the employer’s alleged business justification for the
discharge, showing pretext.
7. Evidence of unusual efforts by a senior manager or officer to retaliate
against the employee. For example, if a senior officer who is not
responsible for evaluating the employee’s performance and who typically
does not evaluate the performance of such employees, it would be very
suspicious if the senior officer spends time papering the personnel file of
the employee to create a justification for terminating the employee. It is
also the type of conduct that may demonstrate malice.
E. Maximizing Damages
The employer’s animus toward the employee’s protected activity is a
strong indication of malice. Similarly, evidence that the employer deviated
from policies or protocols in terminating the employee can help prove
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malice.
To obtain substantial punitive damages, it is critical to focus on what it
would cost to deter the employer from violating the public policy. For
example, requiring an employer to merely pay a discharged employee lost
wages will not deter an employer who terminates an employee for reporting
the discharge of toxic waste into public waterways. Instead, requiring the
employer to pay the cost of cleaning up the pollution it caused is a greater
deterrent.
The plaintiff’s evidence of damages should be as detailed as the evidence
of the employer’s liability. For example, a plaintiff should proffer detailed
evidence of the basis for calculating lost wages and benefits, and should
offer detailed testimony from friends and family of the plaintiff describing
how the wrongful discharge affected the plaintiff.

F. Employee Attributes that Strengthen a Wrongful Discharge Claim
Before choosing to represent the terminated employee, know the
attributes that defense counsel fear most:
1. A long-term employee (more than nine years) with a satisfactory or
better performance record and at least some prior expertise in the public
policy basis of her complaint.
2. An employee who discloses wrongdoing in a timely manner using the
employer’s established complaint protocol in a non-contumacious manner.
3. An employee who is not complicit in her employer’s wrongdoing.
4. An employee who objects about a matter of public concern (e.g., a
matter relating to public health or safety).
5. An employee who cooperates fully in her employer’s investigation of
her disclosure.
7. An employee who the employer terminates within six (6) months of
her protected disclosure, exercise of a statutory right, or refusal to engage
in an illegal act.

G. Selecting a Theme
Before trying the case, be prepared to answer the core question in the
minds of jurors: why does the plaintiff deserve relief? Keep the focus on
the employer’s conduct and make the jury understand why your client
found it necessary to object to the employer’s behavior. Emphasize the
public interest aspect of the case. For example, if your client refused to
follow orders to sell contaminated food, focus on the employer’s callous
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disregard for public safety. The employer’s motive for terminating plaintiff
is not just a core legal element; it is also a core focus of the plaintiff’s trial
presentation.
In selecting and developing your theme, the following guidelines set
forth in Charles L. Belcon’s Alta’s Litigating Tort Cases § 12:10 (2008) are
useful:
1. Does the theme summarize the “story”?
2. Does it have factual as well as emotional appeal?
3. Does it paint a visual image for the jury?
4. Does it blend with the life experiences, values, and perceptions of
jurors?
5. Does it apply classical rhetorical principles of ethos, pathos, and
logos?
6. Does it guide the jurors’ decision-making process?
7. Is it consistent with the applicable legal instructions?
8. Does it point out the injustice in the case and allow the jurors to view
a victory for the client as somehow advancing community interests?
9. Does the theme have universal application?451

XIV. CONCLUSION
Adler, Bowman, and Carl claims provide a fertile ground for discharged
employees to hold employers accountable for terminations that violate a
clear mandate of public policy, including the opportunity to recover
substantial punitive damages. This amorphous, yet potent, tort provides a
powerful tool to employees that should enable plaintiffs to continue to
obtain high verdicts against employers who violate a clear mandate of
public policy in terminating employees.

451

See Charles L. Belcon, Alta’s Litigating Tort Cases § 12:10 (2008).

